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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LMV LEASING, INC.,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890504-CA

ROY W. MALLORY, VAL CONLIN,
BARBARA CONLIN, TUBBER T.
OKUDA, MARY Y. OKUDA,

No. 14b

Defendants/Appellants

TUBBER K. OKUDA, MARY
OKUDA, VAL J. CONLIN, and
BARBARA CONLIN,

Y.

Third-Party Plaintiffs,

MAUREEN MALLORY,
Third-Party Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a lease agreement between LMV Leasing,
Inc. (hereafter "LMV", "Plaintiff" or the "Lessor") and the lessee,
M.C.O., Inc., (hereafter "MCO") which was personally guaranteed by
each of the defendants, Roy W. Mallory, Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin,
Tubber T. Okuda, and Mary Y. Okuda.

MCO, Inc., was not made a

defendant in this case because of the automatic stay arising from
its filing for bankruptcy.

Roy W. Mallory is not a party to this

appeal as a result of Malloryfs

filing for bankruptcy relief.

Defendants Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin, Tubber T. Okuda, and Mary
Y. Okuda (hereafter collectively referred to as "Defendants")
appeal the summary judgment obtained against them.

JURISDICTION
Respondent's brief is filed in response to the appeal taken
to the Utah Supreme Court by Defendants Conlins and Okudas pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j ) (Supp. 1989).

The Utah Supreme

Court subsequently assigned this appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals under Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The trial
court certified this case for appeal under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, leaving only the third-party complaint against
Maureen Mallory for later disposition.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants appeal a summary judgment granted against them as
guarantors of a lease contract in default.

LMV, a Pennsylvania

corporation, as Lessor, originally signed a lease agreement with
MCO, a Utah corporation, doing business as American International
Rent-A-Car, in order to provide MCO with a fleet of cars for its
business. The lease contract was personally guaranteed by each of
the Defendants.

MCO defaulted in its lease payments and, a few

months later, after notice to all parties, LMV repossessed and sold
the cars. LMV then initiated this action to recover as damages the
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amount due under the lease less interest of six (6) percent and
less the net proceeds from the car sales,
LMV prevailed on a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue
of

liability.

The

Court

directed

the

parties

by

telephone

conference to submit the issue of damages by affidavit.

Both

parties submitted affidavits without comment or objection as to
form of disposition.

Defendants' motion to strike LMV's affidavit

concerning attorney fees was denied.

The trial court thereafter

awarded LMV damages and attorney fees and certified the judgment
for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The only issue remaining in the trial court involves the thirdparty complaint against Maureen Mallory.
LMV contends that the issue of liability is clear in this case
-- that regardless of whether the agreement is termed a true lease
or a security agreement, the guarantors are liable for payment of
the remaining lease payments.

The remaining issues, LMV contends,

all go to the issue of damages and mitigation of damages, including
such

issues

as whether

the cars were

sold

in a

commercially

reasonable manner, whether there was impairment of the collateral,
and whether there were any remaining material factual issues as to
mitigation of damages.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
IS IT NECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER THE TRANSACTION WAS A
LEASE OR A SECURITY AGREEMENT

IN ORDER

TO DETERMINE

WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE AS PERSONAL GUARANTORS?
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDE UNDER THE AFFIDAVITS
PRESENTED BEFORE IT THAT THE VEHICLES HAD BEEN SOLD IN
A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70A-9-504(3)?
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDE ACCORDING TO THE
AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED BEFORE IT THAT THE VEHICLES HAD BEEN
SOLD IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER PURSUANT TO THE
LEASE?
DID THE DEFENDANTS PROPERLY RAISE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
THE ISSUE OF IMPAIRMENT OF COLLATERAL?
DID

THE

TRIAL

COURT

CORRECTLY

AWARD

DAMAGES

AFTER

REVIEWING THE PARTIES' AFFIDAVITS AS TO MITIGATION OF
DAMAGES?
ARE THE DEFENDANTS PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM RAISING THEIR
OBJECTION
ATTORNEY

TO
FEES

DECIDING
BY

THE

MEMORANDA

QUESTION
AND

OF

DAMAGES

AFFIDAVITS

BY

AND

THEIR

FAILURE TO RAISE THIS OBJECTION WITH THE TRIAL COURT?
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENY THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO STRIKE THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S AFFIDAVIT AS TO
ATTORNEY FEES?
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K26), (38) (1981).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-50M1), (3) (1981).

3.

Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1981).

4.

Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-9-507(2) (1981).

5.

Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp, 1989).

6.

Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

7.

Rule 4-501(5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

8.

Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

9.

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

10.

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This case involves a deficiency

action filed

against the

Defendants as personal guarantors of a lease contract. (Record, at
13).

The primary obligor under the contract, MCO, defaulted in the

agreed payment under the contract, and the Defendants failed to pay
any of the remaining lease payments. (Record, at 251-54).
Defendants appeal the trial court1s grant of summary judgment
on

the

issue

of

liability

because,

they

argue,

whether

the

agreement was a lease or a security arrangement is a disputed
material fact.

LMV responds that whether the agreement was a lease
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or a security agreement is immaterial because the suit concerns
guarantor liability only and all other issues go to damages and
mitigation of damages.
U.C.C.

governs

this

LMV asserts that, whether or not the Utah
case,

a

duty

to

conduct

a

commercially

reasonable sale existed because that duty was explicitly provided
in the lease contract. (Record, at 23, para. 19). Furthermore, LMV
asserts

that

it

conducted

the

sale

of

the

vehicles

in

a

commercially

reasonable manner after giving adequate notice to

Defendants.

LMV denies that any impairment of the collateral

occurred.
LMV further asserts that the trial court correctly ruled that
there remained no material issue of fact precluding judgment as a
matter of law on the issue of damages.

Plaintiff also asserts that

the Defendants waived all rights to object to the trial court's
decision by affidavit because the Defendants failed to raise their
objection with the court below.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition:
The trial court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of liability. (Record, at 514-15).

The Court

then requested the parties to submit memoranda and affidavits on
the issue of damages.
no

indication

Defendants

did

of

(Record, at 515-16).

Defendants'

object

to

the

objection
Plaintiff's

The record contains
to

this

affidavit

procedure.
regarding

attorneys'' fees and moved to strike that affidavit. (Record, at

6

531).

The trial court denied the Defendants' Motion to Strike and

awarded the Plaintiff attorneys' fees and damages representing the
remaining unpaid lease payments less six (6) percent interest and
less the net proceeds from the sale of the cars. (Record, at 55051).

The trial court did not award LMV liquidated damages as

provided in the contract. (Record, at 538, 540).
Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented:
Val Conlin, President of MCO, entered into an agreement with
LMV, as Lessor, to have LMV lease to MCO motor vehicles to be
rented

to MCO's

car

rental

customers.

(Record,

at

13).

The

agreement was formalized in a lease contract entitled The Preferred
Vehicle Lease Agreement (hereafter the "Lease") on December 29,
1986. (Exhibit F; Record, at 13-31).

In compliance with the Lease,

the Lessor delivered to MCO fourteen (14) motor vehicles. (Record,
at 324).
monthly

Section 4 of the Lease provided that MCO would make

lease payments

to LMV as rent

vehicles. (Record, at 15).

for each of the motor

Section 4.1 of the Lease stated that

a late charge would be assessed to MCO for late or missed payments
equal to two percent (2%) per month of the lease payment amount
past due. (Record, at 15). The Lease further stated that MCO was
responsible for payment of titling, registration, licensing, and
all inspections of the motor vehicles leased from LMV (Record, at
17, para. 7 ) ; that in the event of default by MCO in payment of the
monthly rental amount LMV could declare all unpaid future rentals
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immediately due and payable (Record, at 22, para. 18.1); that MCO
agreed to pay for any and all expenses LMV incurred in exercising
its remedies and rights as outlined under the Lease, including
attorneys'

fees,

legal

expenses, and

court

costs

incurred

in

collecting all amounts due under the Lease. (Exhibit G; Record, at
23, para. 18.2).
On January 26, 1987, Defendants Val and Barbara Conlin, in
their

individual

capacities,

executed

an

unconditional

and

irrevocable guarantee of payment, in which they agreed to guarantee
the

performance

and

prompt

payment

of

all

sums

and

other

obligations of MCO which had become due or which thereafter would
become

du€> to

LMV, which

sums

included

all

titling

fees

and

liquidated damages due to LMV by MCO pursuant to MCO's default
under the terms of the Lease. (Exihbit G; Record, at 111).
February

On

11, 1987, Defendants Tubber and Mary Okuda, in their

individual capacities, executed an unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee of payment, the provisions of which were identical to the
guarantee document signed by the Conlins. (Exhibit H; Record, at
113).
MCO defaulted under the terms of the Lease by failing to make
any monthly payments to LMV after September 1987. (Record, at 325;
Defendants1 Brief, at 10).

On January 26, 1988, LMV's Pennsylvania

counsel notified the Defendants Conlin and the Defendants Okuda by
mailing a notice to the said Defendants' last known address and
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notifying them that MCO was in default under the terms of the Lease
with LMV. (Record, at 112, 114).

All Defendants in this action

failed to respond to the notice sent by LMV. (Record, at 253).
Pursuant to the explicit remedies of LMV under the Lease, LMV
repossessed the vehicles in March of 1988 and placed those vehicles
with Nate Wade Subaru, a local new and used car dealer, to be sold
for LMV. (Record, at 325; Defendants1 Brief, at 10).

Mr. Edward

McCracken, an agent of LMV, mailed a Notice of Sale by certified
mail, and by regular mail, to each of the Defendants and to MCO on
April 4, 1988, to notify them that the motor vehicles would be
sold. (Record, at 325). The Notice of Sale indicated that MCO had
defaulted

under the Lease, that LMV would

sell the vehicles,

pursuant to the terms of the Lease, after April 13, 1988, what the
terms of the sale would be, that the vehicles were located at the
Nate Wade Subaru car lot at 1207 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and that the motor vehicles would be sold in the same fashion
and manner as other used vehicles at that location (Exhibit I;
Record, at 328-32).
returned

None of the regularly mailed notices were

and no written or oral response

from

the Defendants

regarding the notices was received. (Record, at 326).
The motor vehicles were sold from the lot at Nate Wade Subaru
within a one (1) month period, with the first vehicle being sold
on May 10, 1988, and the last vehicle being sold on June 10, 1988.
(Record, at 326). All Defendants admit that they have failed and
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refused to make any payments at any time to LMV. (Record, at 370,
385).

At the time this action was commenced, MCO was a debtor in

a case under the United States Bankruptcy Code and therefore was
not a defendant in this case. (Record, at 367, 379).
LMV initiated this action on April 12, 1988, seeking to hold
the Defendants liable as guarantors for payments due under the
Lease which were not recovered through the sale of the collateral.
(Record, at 2-12).
Judgment.

In August of 1988, Plaintiff moved for Summary

The trial court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment

on October 13, 1988. (Record, at 402-03). On February 13, 1989,
Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment as to liability only. (Record,
at 448-50).

The trial court notified all parties by telephone on

March 1, 1989, that the trial court had granted Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. (Record, at 473;
Defendants' Brief, at 13). On March 14, 1989, the trial judge by
telephone conference stated that the issue of damages would be
determined by affidavits and memoranda to be submitted by Plaintiff
and Defendants. (Defendants' Brief, at 13). Nothing in the record
suggests that the defendant objected to this procedure at any time.
Nor does Defendants' appellate brief suggest that they objected at
any time.

After submission of memoranda and affidavits from all

parties, the Defendants moved to strike the Plaintiff's affidavit
for attorney's fees on April 24, 1989. (Record, at 531-32).

10

On April 26, 1989, the trial court announced by telephone
conference its decision on the issue of damages (Defendants' Brief,
at 14). In its final judgment, dated May 4, 1989, the trial court
denied the Plaintiff's request to calculate the damages on the
basis of liquidated damages, and decided instead that the damages
should be based on the unamortized balance of the lease payments
owed, plus all unpaid and accrued monthly lease payments, late
charges, and administrative fees, less the net proceeds from the
sale of the motor vehicles, which resulted in a final assessment
of damages less than the Plaintiff had requested,
Record, at 547-49).

(Exhibit

J;

The court awarded the Plaintiff $50,500.00,

which represents damages in the amount of $37,000.00, plus interest
thereon at the rate of ten percent

(10%) per annum compounded

annually, and attorneys' fees of $13,500.00. (Record, at 551).
The

trial

commercially

court

further

reasonable

manner

concluded
when

it

that

"LMV

repossessed

acted

in a

the

motor

vehicles and sold them on a used car lot through a private sale.
This method of sale produced a greater amount of sales proceeds
upon the sale of the motor vehicles than would have been produced
by selling them at an auction to a used car dealer at substantially
lower prices." (Record, at 550).
were

based

on

uncontroverted

Plaintiff's affidavits:

The trial court's conclusions

and

unopposed

facts

raised

in

The net proceeds from the sale of the

motor vehicles totalled $80,100.00, which is approximately ninety-
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nine percent (99%) of the motor vehicles' wholesale values based
on their wholesale

book value as listed

in Automotive

Market

Research, a weekly nationwide publication used by the fleet vehicle
leasing industry as a benchmark for determining wholesale prices
of

automobiles.

(Record,

at 326).

Pursuant

to

an effort

to

increase the amount of sale proceeds from the sale of the motor
vehicles, LMV elected to sell the motor vehicles on a used car lot
rather than selling them at an auction to a used car dealer at
substantially lower prices. (Record, at 326).
who,

as controller

for

LMV,

is

Mr. Ed McCracken,

"familiar with

the underlying

concepts and methods utilized in the disposition of used cars,"
(Record, at 511), attested that it is not unusual in the fleet
vehicle leasing industry to sell repossessed vehicles through a
used car dealership by placing the vehicles on a used car lot for
sale.

(Record,

at

508-09).

The

trial

court

also

denied

the

Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit for Attorney's Fees because
the Plaintiff's affidavit substantially complied with the rules
set forth in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. (Record, at
550-51).

Defendants subsequently filed a notice of appeal on June

1, 1989. (Record, at 553-54).
As

to

each

of

the

factual

propositions

raised

above,

Defendants do not oppose the factual contentions therein by way of
counter-affidavit.

Instead, Defendants attempt to rebut the trial

court's conclusion that the sale was conducted in a commercially
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reasonable manner by raising affidavits purporting to say that
offers

were

made

to

the

Plaintiff

which

were

ignored.

The

affidavit of Alma Egbert, dated August 31, 1988, asserts that he
contacted officers of LMV and LMV's attorney, Weston Harris, and
communicated

his

interest

in

purchasing

or

making

other

arrangements to retain the vehicles in MCO, that he requested
information on numerous occasions regarding

the status of the

leases and the pay-off balance but was never provided information
regarding the leased vehicles nor given a response to his "offer",
and that he was financially capable of purchasing all the vehicles.
(Record, at 283-85).

Egbert's affidavit does not make any mention

of specific offer terms such as price, but only states that Egbert
contacted

LMV's

representatives

on

different

occasions

and

expressed an interest or requested information.
Likewise the affidavit of Loren E. Weiss, dated August 18,
1988, states that as the attorney for the debtor in possession,
MCO, he discussed the leases with Wes Harris, the attorney for the
Plaintiff, and informed Mr. Harris that Mr. Egbert was willing to
assume the leases or purchase the vehicles. (Record, at 286-88).
No mention is made of any specific contract offer _terms, such as
price, financing, etc.
The affidavits of Val. J. Conlin, dated February 20, 1989, and
March 18, 1989, state that Mr. Conlin was personally familiar with
the conditions and mileage of each of the cars under the Lease.
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(Record, at 489 )•

Mr. Conlin stated that he received the notice

of sale and sent representatives to inspect the vehicles to insure
that the vehicles were in reasonable operating condition and that
he

would

have

purchased

the

vehicles

for

Allstate

for

sums

substantially in excess of the prices received by LMV. (Record, at
468).

He

states

that

he

requested

that

an

Blackner, inspect the cars. (Record, at 490).

associate,

Ivar

In Mr. Blacknerfs

affidavit, dated September 27, 1988, he states that Mr. Conlin had
requested him to inspect the repossessed vehicles held at Nate Wade
Subaru in preparation for submitting bids.

Mr. Blackner said he

went to the used car lot for this purpose but was not allowed to
see the cars, that he went back twice more and again was not
permitted

to

inspect

Blackner ' does

not

the vehicles.

state

any

reason

(Record,
as

at 393-94).

to why

he

permission to examine vehicles on a public car lot.
Defendants1

was

Mr.
denied

None of the

affidavits state that any bid or offer, written or

oral, was ever communicated to the Plaintiff, or that any specific
price or financing was ever discussed.

Nor does Mr. Conlin in his

affidavit assert that his willingness to purchase the vehicles for
some substantial sum in excess of prices received by LMV Leasing
was ever communicated to anyone.
By contrast Mr. Conlin admits that he received the notice of
sale. (Record, at 468).
defaulted

under

The notice of sale states that MCO had

the Lease, that

14

LMV would

sell the vehicles,

pursuant to the terms of the Lease, after April 13, 1988, what the
terms of the sale would be, where the motor vehicles were then
currently located, and that the motor vehicles would be sold in
the

same

fashion

and

manner

as

location. (Record, at 328-32).

other

used

vehicles

at

that

The affidavit of Mr. McCracken

states that the net proceeds from the sale of the motor vehicles
totalled $80,100.00, after subtracting the cost of refurbishing
the vehicles, preparing them for sale, and the costs of the sale
itself; that the net proceeds of $80,100.00 represent approximately
ninety-nine percent (99%) of the motor vehicles' wholesale values
based on their wholesale book value as listed in Automotive Market
Research, a weekly nationwide publication used by the fleet vehicle
leasing industry as a benchmark for determining wholesale prices
of automobiles. (Record, at 509-10).
unopposed by Defendants' affidavits.

These sworn statements are
Mr. McCracken further states

that it is not unusual in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to
sell repossessed vehicles through a used car dealership by placing
the vehicles on a used car lot for sale.

(Record, at 326-27).

This statement is also unopposed by Defendants.

Mr. McCracken's

affidavit of April 13, 1989, further asserts that, prior to his
review of Mr. Egbert's petition for relief, Amended Chapter 13
Plan, and the Order of Dismissal, Mr. McCracken had never received
any documents, correspondence, or other material from or regarding
Mr. Egbert concerning his financial condition, any proposed sale
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of the motor vehicles, or any documentation outlining any proposal
of any party to assume the Lease. (Record, at 512). This statement
also goes unopposed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the

issue of liability because the Defendants1 liability as personal
guarantors is clear regardless of whether the agreement was a lease
or a security agreement.
2.

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the

issue of damages because Plaintiff complied with the requirements
of a commercially reasonable sale under the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code and Defendants failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact.
3.

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the

issue of a commercially reasonable sale because Plaintiff complied
with the requirement of a commercially reasonable sale under the
Lease.
4.

Defendants

are

barred

from

raising

the

issue

of

impairment of collateral because they failed to raise this issue
in opposition to the motions for summary judgment and now raise
this issue by reference to an unverified pleading.
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5.

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the

issue of damages because Defendants have not raised any genuine
issues of material fact before the trial court.
6.

The Defendants are barred from raising the issue of the

trial court's decision based upon affidavits

on the issue of

damages because Defendants waived any rights they may have had by
failing to raise this issue with the trial court and by awaiting
the trial court outcome before raising the issue on appeal.
7.

The trial court correctly denied Defendants' motion to

strike the affidavit on attorney's

fees because the affidavit

substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 4-505(1) of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and applicable case law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY BECAUSE
DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE AS GUARANTORS OF THE CONTRACT
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE AGREEMENT WAS ONE FOR
SECURITY OR WAS A LEASE.

The standards for granting or denying summary judgment are
clear.

Although the trial court, on a motion for summary judgment,

is obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the defendants, Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P. 2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), the trial court may grant summary judgment where there is
no genuine issue of material fact or where, according to the facts
as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.
Procedure.

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil

All material facts set forth in a movant's affidavit

which remain uncontroverted are deemed to be true for the purpose
of

summary

judgment.

Administration.

Rule

4-501(5),

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Where factual contentions of the non-moving party

are not supported by specific evidentiary facts, summary judgment
is appropriate.

Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah

1985).
Defendants assert that the Lease between LMV and MCO is not
a true lease, but a lease intended for security, and therefore
there is a disputed, material fact that could not be resolved by
summary judgment.
However, the issue of whether the Lease is a true lease or a
lease

intended

for

security

does

not

control

the

issues

of

guarantor liability or the total amount of damages LMV is entitled
to recover under the terms of the Lease.
If the Lease is one intended as security, it is treated as
any other security agreement under Utah's Uniform Commercial Code.
In Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501(l) (1981), it states in pertinent
part:
When a debtor is in default under a security
agreement, a secured party has the rights and
remedies provided in this part and except as limited
by subsection (3) those provided in the security
agreement.
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(Emphasis

added).

Subsection

(3) of

§

70A-9-501

deals

with

accounting for surplus of proceeds from the sale of collateral,
disposition of the collateral, acceptance of the collateral in
return for discharge of the obligation, provisions for redemption
of the collateral, and the secured party's liability for failing
to comply with this section of the Uniform Commercial Code,
The Lease in this case is explicit in outlining the cumulative
and non-exclusive remedies available to LMV upon default by MCO.
The trial court awarded damages to the Plaintiff with the Lease
provisions and formulas in mind.

(Record, at 535-42).

None of

the enumerated provisions in subsection (3) of § 70A-9-501 are
contrary to the damages provisions of the Lease and therefore do
not have the effect of limiting the Lease provisions.
Defendants alleged such at trial or on appeal.

Nor have

Therefore, even if

the Lease is a lease intended for security, as Defendants contend,
the damages provisions in the Lease are still enforceable under
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code and therefore, Defendants are liable
to LMV for the total amount of damages under the Lease.
Furthermore, the issue of guarantor liability is not affected
by whether the Lease is a lease or a security agreement.

Recently,

the Utah Court of Appeals decided a case with issues similar to
those presented in the case at hand.

In First Security Financial

v. Okland Ltd., Inc., 750 P.2d 195 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the trial
court granted a summary judgment against the defendant based on the
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defendant's breach of an equipment lease agreement.

The Court of

Appeals reviewed the lower court's decision and found that the
damages provided in the lease agreement and awarded by the local
court were proper.

In responding to the defendant's contention

that the lease was a security agreement and therefore the damages
provided for under the lease could not be recovered, the Court
stated:
Furthermore, Okland has not asserted any specific
defenses or counterclaims as a debtor under Article
9. Given that failure, it makes no difference if
the contract at issue is viewed as a lease agreement
or a sales agreement. The monthly payments required
are either lease payments or installment sales
payments. However denominated, monthly payments and
any other damages designated in the contract as
payable upon default, are recoverable as a basic
matter of contract law in this case.
Id. at 198-99

(emphasis added).

Likewise,
counterclaims

Defendants

in this case

assert

<as to the issue of guarantor

no

defenses

liability.

or

As to

damages, Defendants assert the defense of inadequate mitigation of
damages stemming from the requirement of a commercially reasonable
sale of the collateral.

However, this requirement is no different

than required by the Lease itself.

Furthermore, Defendants have

not asserted any other specific defenses based on the provisions
of the Utah U.C.C.

Therefore, it makes no difference whether the

Lease is a true lease or a lease intended for security because,
under

either

commercially

scenario, there

is an explicit

requirement

of a

reasonable sale of the collateral, and defendants
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assert no other explicit U.C.C. defense in their brief or in the
record

below.

Furthermore,

the

Utah

U.C.C.

makes

explicit

provision for finding damages according to the provisions of the
security agreement.

Therefore, even if the agreement was one for

security, LMV is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS DO NOT
RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT SUFFICIENT
TO OPPOSE A FINDING THAT THE VEHICLES WERE SOLD IN
A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER UNDER THE UTAH
U.C.C.
Defendants argue in one place in their brief that this Court
should rule, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiff did not dispose
of

the

vehicles

in

a

commercially

reasonable

manner

(see

Defendants' Brief, at 33), yet in another place they argue merely
that

there

judgment.

are

unresolved

issues

of

fact

precluding

summary

(See Defendants' Brief, at 15). LMV argues that under

either scenario the trial court should be affirmed.
A.

Plaintiff Complied With The Notice Requirements Of The Utah
Uniform Commercial Code.
LMV asserts that the Lease entered into between it and MCO is

a true lease.

However, even if the Lease were found to be a sales

transaction

rather

Defendants

regarding

than

a

lease,

the sale of

LMV's

notification

to

the vehicles was done

the
in a

commercially reasonable manner.
In Utah's Uniform Commercial Code, § 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code
Ann. (1981), it states:
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••.reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is
to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor....
Sections 70A-1-201(26 ) and 70A-1-201(38), respectively, provide
that:
A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or
notification to another by taking such steps as may
be reasonably required to inform the other in
ordinary course whether or not such other actually
comes to know of it....
"Send" in connection with any writing or notice
means to deposit in the mail or deliver for
transmission
by
any
other
usual
means
of
communication with postage or cost of transmission
provided for and properly addressed and in the case
of an instrument to an address specified thereon or
otherwise agreed....
LMV

provided

reasonable

notification

of

the

sale of

the

vehicles by sending the notices by certified mail, return receipt
requested, and by regular mail to the Defendants and MCO at the
addresses the Defendants had provided to LMV. (Record, at 325-26).
The steps LMV took in notifying the Defendants in the ordinary
course by properly addressing and depositing the notices in the
mail were in strict compliance with the above statute.
the

notice

itself

provided

the

Defendants

with

the

Finally,
necessary

information to protect themselves by permitting them to bid at the
sale or "arrange for interested parties to bid, and to otherwise
assure that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner".

FMA Financial Corp. vs. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 807

(Utah 1979).
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Furthermore, Defendants do not assert in their affidavits or
memoranda to the trial court nor in their appellate brief that
LMV's Notice of Default or the subsequent Notice of Sale do not
meet the requirements of the Utah U.C.C.

Nor do Defendants oppose

LMVfs affidavit attesting to the service of any of the notices and
the adequacy of the contents thereof. Therefore, LMV complied with
the notice requirements of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
B.

The Sale Of The Vehicles Itself Was Reasonable Under Utah's
Uniform Commercial Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-90-507(2) (1981) provides:
If the secured party either sells the collateral in
the usual manner in any recognized market therefor
or if he sells at the price current in such market
at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold
in conformity with reasonable commercial practices
among dealers in the type of property sold he has
sold in a commercially reasonable manner.

(Emphasis added).

Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in Security

State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1987), held that
selling

a

repossessed

vehicle

without

newspaper

advertisement

through a used car lot is commercially reasonable if doing so is
an accepted commercial practice.
LMV sold the vehicles in strict conformity with the above
statute.

The vehicles LMV repossessed from MCO were used vehicles.

After their repossession, the vehicles were placed on a used car
lot.

The vehicles were sold by a used car dealer in the same

manner as other used cars on the lot, in the same market as the
other used cars on the lot, and in conformity with the dealer's
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practice of selling used cars. (Record, at 508-09).

In addition,

selling

an

repossessed

vehicles

in

this

fashion

is

accepted

commercial practice in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to which
Defendants1 affidavits do not

LMV belongs. (Record, at 508-09).

assert any facts which controvert any of LMV's affidavits as to
whether the* actual sale was executed in the usual manner or was in
conformity with commercial practices among used car dealers.
Defendants cite the Utah case of Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc.
v. Glaubensklee, 649 P. 2d 28 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that,
in general, an automobile dealer should advertise a repossessed car
in a newspaper of general circulation for a reasonable period of
time and in a manner consistent with which other used cars are
advertised. (Defendants1 Brief, at 21).

However, Defendants do not

disclose the fact that Pioneer Dodge was a public auction case.
By contrast, the present case did not involve a public auction,
where advertising is presumably essential to obtain competitive
bids.

While Pioneer Dodge makes advertising a legal prerequisite

to a reasonable public sale, that case defines "public sale" as
"one to which the public is invited by advertisement to appear and
bid at auction for the goods to be sold."
Restatement

of

Security

§

48

comment

.Id. at 30 (citing

(1941)).

Thus,

the

requirement of advertising is inextricably intertwined with the
concept of a public sale by auction.

However, in the present case,

the commercially reasonable practice among local used car dealers
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not selling at auction is to sell in the same manner and same
fashion as other used cars sold at the Nate Wade Subaru lot.
Defendants

do

not

oppose

the

affidavit

of

Ed

McCracken,

a

businessman familiar with the usual methods of disposition of used
cars, attesting to the fact that auction sales net "substantially
lower prices" than typical used car lot sales, and that it is not
unusual in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to sell repossessed
vehicles through a used car dealership by placing the vehicles on
the used car lot for sale. (Record, at 326, 508-09, 511-12).
Plaintiff1s

position

is supported

by

the

recent

case of

Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469 (Utah 1987).

In

Security State Bank, a bank repossessed a truck held as a purchase
money security interest and sold the truck from a used car lot
without newspaper or other public advertisement.
The debtor

sought

reversal

of

a deficiency

_Id. at 470-72.

judgment

obtained

against him, arguing, inter alia, that the sale of the truck
through

a

used

car

lot

without

newspaper

advertisement

commercially unreasonable as a matter of law.

Rejecting this

claim, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Debtor insists that the sale was unreasonable
as a matter of law because bank did not
solicit bids through newspaper advertisement
and received three bids on the truck.
In
support of his argument, debtor cites FMA
Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803
(Utah 1979).
Debtor's reliance on FMA
Financial Corp. is misplaced. In that case,
we merely commented that the creditor's
failure to advertise the sale and its casual
bid procedures were evidence that it had not
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was

met its burden of establishing commercial
reasonableness. Id. at 807. Whether a sale
is commercially reasonable is a matter to be
determined on a case-by-case basis according
to the circumstances of the sale and the
business context
in which
it occurred.
Scharf, 700 P. 2d at 1070-71. In this case,
bank presented expert testimony indicating
that selling repossessed vehicles through a
used car lot was in conformity with usual
commercial
practice.
The
commercial
reasonableness of the sale is also evidenced
by the fact that debtor's own expert witnesses
admitted
that
it
is
rare
to
recover
substantially more than Blue Book value for a
repossessed vehicle.
Id.

at

472

(emphasis

procedurally

added).

different,

Although

LMV

supports

the
its

present

case

contention

of

is
a

commercially reasonable sale by affidavit specifically stating that
M

[i]t is not unusual in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to sell

repossessed vehicles through a used car dealership by

...

by

selling them in the same manner and fashion as the other used cars
on the

lot."

(Record, at

508-09).

The affiant of

the above

statement attests that he is "familiar with the underlying concepts
and methods utilized in the disposition of used cars . . . . "
(Record, at 511).

Defendants do not oppose these affidavits or

produce any affidavits stating that it was the usual practice to
sell

repossessed

advertisement.

vehicles

on

used

car

lots

by

newspaper

Rather, Defendants, in their brief, attempt to

establish a requirement to advertise as a matter of law, using the
Pioneer Dodge case as support.

(See Defendants1 Brief, at 21, 33).

Security

refutes

State

Bank

clearly
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such

an

absolute

legal

requirement.

Since

there

is no

legal

requirement,

the

only

question is whether Defendants have raised in their affidavits a
factual issue as to the need to advertise by newspaper.

Since they

failed to do this, summary judgment was appropriate.
Defendants also claim that they were "prevented from bidding
on

the

vehicles."

(Defendants'

Brief,

at

22). However,

the

affidavit of Val Conlin, dated March 18, 1989, states that he "was
personally familiar with conditions and mileage of each of the cars
being leased from LMV Leasing." (Record, at 489).
states

that

he

repossessed."

"would

have

purchased

all

of

Conlin also
the

vehicles

However, no where in Conlin1s

(Record, at 489).

affidavits or in Ivar Blackner's affidavit is there any affirmative
statement

indicating

communicate,
inspection.

a bid

or

any

communication

offer

subject

of,

to

the

or

attempt

condition

of

to
an

Furthermore, it is strange that Conlin required such

an inspection prior to communicating a conditional bid or offer to
LMV because Conlin states that he had "personal knowledge" of the
condition

and

mileage

of

each

of

the

cars

and

"would

have"

Defendants cite also as support the case of Haggis
Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc., 745 P.2d 442 (Utah
1985).
However, Haggis is inapposite because it involved the
private sale of a restaurant and liquor store without public
advertisement.
Private sale of such unique collateral without
auction, public bidding or advertisement seems commercially
unreasonable, unlike the common sales of used cars where there are
established markets for resale and where sales prices are governed
by objective pricing criteria.
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purchased them.

Rather, Defendants would impose an impossible

standard on lessors trying to mitigate damages by requiring them
to read the minds of prospective bidders who have failed to
communicate their definite intentions to bid after adequate notice
of sale.

Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate because

Conlin and Blackner failed, on the face of their affidavits, to
communicate any bid or offer,
C.

Plaintiff Obtained A Reasonable Price For The Sale Of The
Repossessed Vehicles.
Section 70A-9-507(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953) states that:
The fact that a better price could have been
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a
different method from that selected by the secured
party is not of itself sufficient to establish that
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable
manner.
Pursuant to the Lease, LMV repossessed

prepared them for sale.

the vehicles and

In an attempt to increase the amount of

potential proceeds from their sale, LMV sold the vehicles through
a used cear lot rather than auctioning them off to a used car
dealer. (Record, at 326).

The net proceeds from their sale

totalled approximately ninety-nine percent (99%) of their combined
wholesale value, based on the vehicles' wholesale value listed in
Automotive Market Research, a weekly nationwide publication used
by the fleet vehicle leasing industry to determine wholesale prices
of automobiles. (Record, at 326).

Defendants do not attempt to

show by counter-affidavit that these prices were unreasonable.
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Furthermore, Defendants' claim, that Conlin would have purchased
the

vehicles

for

sums

substantially

in excess

of

the

prices

received by LMV, is irrelevant because that intention was never
communicated to LMV.

Therefore, Defendants have failed to counter

LMV?s affidavits showing that the sales price was commercially
reasonable and summary judgment was appropriate.
POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE
OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS
DO NOT RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
SUFFICIENT TO OPPOSE A FINDING THAT THE
VEHICLES WERE SOLD IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
MANNER UNDER THE CONTRACT.

LMV asserts that the sale of the repossessed vehicles was also
commercially

reasonable

as

required

under

the

Lease

terms.

However, the Defendants1 brief assumes that the Lease requirement
of a commercially reasonable sale
commercial

reasonableness

Commercial Code."
raise no new

that

"requires the same tests of

is

required

(Defendants' Brief, at 23).

arguments

by

the

Uniform

Since Defendants

and adopt the arguments and

citations

advanced under their brief's previous heading, LMV adopts those
arguments and citations found in Point II of LMV's brief relating
to the requirements of a commercially reasonable sale under the
U.C.C.
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT PROPERLY
RAISE THE ISSUE OF IMPAIRMENT OF COLLATERAL BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT.
Defendants

raise

four

contentions

with

respect

to

their

argument that LMV was estopped from seeking recovery because of
impairment of the collateral:

(1) that LMV ignored the December

1987 offer of Alma D. Egbert; (2) that LMV permitted Roy Mallory
and Alma D. Egbert to use the vehicles for rentals from December
1987 until March 1988; (3) that, after repossessing the cars, LMV
failed to advertise the vehicles for sale; and (4) that LMV refused
to permit Defendants to inspect the vehicles.

(Defendants' Brief,

at 23).
LMV submits that all four contentions fail to raise issues of
material fact going to the issue of impairment of collateral.

The

case authority cited by Defendants, Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite
Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
speaks of a fiduciary relationship arising between a creditor and
guarantor

and

that

a

guarantor

may

be

partially

or

wholly

discharged from liability "where a creditor's actions impair the
value of collateral in its possession . . . ." _Id. at 108 (emphasis
added).

Since questions of ignoring offers, failing to advertise,

and refusing permission to inspect do not actually affect the value
of

the collateral, but arguably

go instead

to the

reasonable

disposition of collateral, the first, third, and fourth contentions
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should be dismissed.

Furthermore, the first and second contentions

should be dismissed because the cars, prior to their repossession
in March,

1987

(Defendants1

Brief,

at

10), were

not

in

the

possession of the creditor, as required in Valley Bank, thus giving
rise to no fiduciary duties.
In addition to the above reasons, the issue of impairment of
collateral should be dismissed because Defendants base their theory
on a right of subrogation, a right that the Defendants1
authority

concedes

does

not

even

arise

until

payment

case

of

the

guaranteed obligation by the guarantor. (See Defendants' Brief, at
24-25).

Since the defendants/guarantors in this case never made

payment of the guaranteed obligation, no right of subrogation ever
arose, and therefore no concurrent fiduciary duty arose.
Finally, in addition to all the above reasons, Defendants'
argument

that

collateral

an

should

estoppel
be

arose

rejected

based

because

appropriately raised at the trial court.

on
this

impairment
issue

was

of

the

never

None of the Defendants'

memoranda in opposition to the Plaintiff's motions for summary
judgment specifically raised the issue now raised as to impairment
of collateral.

Matters not presented to the trial court may not

be raised for the first time on appeal.

Salt Lake City Corp. v.

James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040,
1044 (Utah 1983)).
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Furthermore,

Defendants'

second

amended

answer,

which

Defendants cite for having raised the issue, is not a verified
pleading. (Defendants' Brief, at 23; Record, at 367-75),

Under

Utah case law, an unverified pleading will not substitute for an
affidavit and therefore will not preclude summary judgment.

See,

e.g. , Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985).

For

all of the above reasons, Defendants1 argument that an estoppel
arose because of Plaintiff's impairment of the collateral should
be rejected.
POINT V:

It

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS DO NOT
RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER THERE WAS MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.

is well

established

that

a non-breaching

party

to a

contract is obligated to take reasonable steps to mitigate his
damages.

Pratt v. Board of E d u c , 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977).
Defendants assert that LMV failed to mitigate its damages

by supposedly rejecting an offer made by Alma D. Egbert ("Egbert")
to purchase the leased vehicles or assume the Lease from MCO. In
support of this contention, an affidavit

of Egbert was filed

stating that he contacted LMV and "communicated his interest in
purchasing the vehicles or in making other arrangements with LMV"
regarding the Lease. (Record, at 284).

In addition, an affidavit

of Loren E. Weiss ("Weiss") was filed, stating that Weiss informed
LMV f s counsel that Egbert was "willing to assume the leases or
purchase the vehicles from LMV." (Record, at 287).
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Defendants rely

on these vague contentions in the affidavits to form the basis for
their defense that LMV rejected Egbertfs "offer" which could have
totally mitigated LMV's damages.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Pratt, held that "[m]itigation of
damages is an affirmative defense. Although plaintiff is obligated
to minimize

his damages, the burden

is upon

the party

whose

wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution
thereof."

564 P. 2d at 298. Defendants have the burden of alleging

facts sufficient to raise an issue as to whether there as an
"offer" made by Egbert which would have substantially or totally
mitigated LMV f s damages as they claim it would.
Defendants fail to raise a material issue in their affidavits.
First, Egbert's affidavit only attests to having communicated an
"interest" in purchasing the car or assuming the Lease.
no

affirmative

establishing

language

an offer.

in

the

There

affidavit

There is

asserting

is only conclusory

facts

language in

Paragraph 6 of the Egbert Affidavit that there was no "response to
his offer and inquiry." (Record, at 284). The Utah Supreme Court
has held that conclusory statements are insufficient to create a
genuine

issue

of

fact.

Reagan

Outdoor

Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984).
an affidavit
sufficient

Advertising

The mere conclusion in

that there was an offer, without

to conclude

that

some kind

alleging

facts

of offer was made, is

insufficient and should not preclude summary judgment.
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Inc. v.

Merely

communicating an "interest" in the vehicles does not allege facts
sufficient to establish an offer.
Weiss'

affidavit

contain

any

Second, neither Egbert's nor

terms

of

an

alleged

"offer"

to

purchase vehicles or assume the Lease, the price Egbert was willing
to pay

for

the vehicles, or how

Plaintiff's damages.

this

"offer" would

mitigate

In short, nothing is presented that raises

any genuine issues of material fact regarding how LMV could have
mitigated its damages.
Furthermore, it is impossible for the Court, based upon the
lack

of

material

facts presented

by

Defendants,

to

determine

whether an "offer" by Egbert to buy the vehicles or assume the
Lease with LMV could have substantially or totally mitigated L M V s
damages as Defendants contend.
Similar deficiencies
Blackner.

In

Conlin's

lie in the affidavits of Conlin and
affidavit

of

March

18,

1989,

Conlin

represents that he "was personally familiar with conditions and
mileage

of

each of

(Record, at 489).

the cars being

leased

from

LMV

Leasing."

He also asserts that he "would have purchased

all of th€i vehicles repossessed . . . ." (Record, at 489). However,
in neither Conlin f s affidavits nor in Blackner's affidavit is there
any fact alleged as to any attempt to communicate any offer or bid,
oral or written, to LMV personnel.

Blackner's affidavit says that

he was denied access to the used car lot by Nate Wade Subaru
personnel

but

does

not

allege

any
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specific

facts

beyond

the

personal conclusion that he was denied access.
94).

(Record, at 393-

The affidavit does not state the reason he was denied access,

the dates on which he attempted to see the cars, or whether the
cars at that moment were being held out for sale to the public.
However, in light of the fact that Conlin was already "personally
familiar with [the] conditions and mileage of each of the cars" and
"would have purchased" them, it is strange that he did not simply
make

an

offer

subject

to

the

condition

of

an

inspection.

Defendants hold LMV to the impossible standard of having to
decipher the minds of potential bidders despite the fact that no
prospective or conditional bids or offers were made.
Finally, Defendants' Comparison Sheet, attached as an exhibit
to their Memorandum of Damages (Record, at 498), comparing the
prices at which LMV actually sold the vehicles to the average price
of the Kelly Blue Book Retail and the Kelly Blue Book Wholesale,
is misleading.

Defendants compare the net sales proceeds of each

car which LMV obtained to the gross sales price in the Kelly Blue
Book average. (See Record, at 498).

Even if most of the sales

costs could be reduced by selling to Conlin, this factual issue is
irrelevant where Defendants failed to communicate such bid or offer
to LMV.
Therefore, the trial court's decision that no genuine issues
of material fact remained on the issue of mitigation of damages
should be affirmed.
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POINT VI: THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON DAMAGES BY AFFIDAVIT WHEN
THEY FAILED TO OBJECT AT THE TIME OF FILING THEIR
MEMORANDUM ON DAMAGES OR AT ANY TIME UPON THE
RECORD.
The Defendants1 brief concedes that "[o]n March 14, 1989,
Judge Brian by telephone conference stated the issue of damages
would be determined by Affidavits and Memorandums to be submitted
by plaintiff and defendants simultaneously."
at 13).

(Defendant's Brief,

Nowhere in their brief do Defendants state that they

objected to this procedure at the time of the telephone conference,
nor do they cite any objection filed with the Court or entered at
any time on the record.

Defendants, however, do assert that they

"did not agree or stipulate to this procedure nor were the parties
asked if this procedure was acceptable."
30).

(Defendants1 Brief, at

By this statement, the Defendants wish to place the burden

of identifying error on the trial judge.
"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court
may not be raised for the first time on appeal."

Salt Lake City

Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P. 2d
1040,

1044

(Utah 1983)).

Allred, 685 P.2d
issue

of

See also, Hobelman Motors, Inc. v.

544 (Utah 1984) (plaintiffs

incorrectly

notarized

affidavit

at

failure to raise
time

of

summary

judgment waived his right to raise this issue on appeal); Franklin
Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983)
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("For

a question to be considered

on appeal, the record must

clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon . . . . " ) . This rule
has been applied even in cases raising issues of constitutional
dimension.

See, e.g., Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Furthermore, it is fair and just to apply

this rule in this case because the Defendants should not be able
to file a memorandum of damages without any objection at any time
to the method of disposition, wait to see whether disposition is
favorable or not, and then raise this objection on appeal.
The same rule should apply regardless of Defendants' argument
that the simultaneous submission of memoranda and affidavits on
damages had the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the
Defendants.
below.

First, the burden of proof did not shift, as explained

However, even if this argument is true, it was foreseeable

prior to submission of the memoranda on damages.

The Defendants,

therefore, should have cured this defect at the trial level, and
delay in raising this issue causes it to be waived.

See Hobelman

Motors, 685 P.2d at 546; Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880
(Utah 1979).
Simultaneous submission of documents does not have the effect
of shifting the burden of proof because Defendants could have
sought permission of the court to respond further to any of LMV's
arguments or affidavits.

The record shows that LMV submitted its
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primary affidavit on damages on April 13, 1989 (Record, at 50213), two v/eeks before the trial judge ruled, on April 26, 1989
(Defendants' Brief, at 14).

Defendants could have acted during

this period of time, as illustrated by their submission of a Motion
to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit on April 24, 1989, (Record, at 53132).

Furthermore, Utah precedent states that mitigation of damages

is an affirmative defense and the burden is upon the party whose
wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution
thereof.

Pratt v. Board of E d u c , 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977).

Since, at the damages portion of the proceedings below, liability
had

already been established,

showing

that the Defendants had

committed the wrongful acts giving rise to the damages, the burden
should properly be placed at the feet of the Defendants. Where the
Defendant has failed to sustain its burden, by producing competent
evidence suggesting Plaintiff had not taken reasonable efforts to
mitigate his damages, the trial court may properly determine that
there was no factual issue concerning damages to submit to the
jury.

Id.
POINT VII:

THE
TRIAL
COURT
CORRECTLY
DENIED
THE
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT FOR
ATTORNEY
FEES
BECAUSE
THE
AFFIDAVIT
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND
APPLICABLE CASE LAW.

Defendants correctly represent that the affidavit of Brett F.
Wood stated the hours spent by each of LMV f s attorneys on the case
but does not specify the hourly rate of each of the four
38

(4)

attorneys.

The affidavit also specifies the number of hours and

the rates per hour of the non-attorneys and the total bill charged
for services by attorneys and non-attorneys. (Record, at 527-28).
Defendants specifically complain that the affidavit should have
stated the hourly rate of each attorney working on the case and
because it did not so state, the trial court erred in denying the
Defendants* Motion to Strike the affidavit.
Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
states:
Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys'
fees must set forth specifically the legal basis for
the award, the nature of the work performed by the
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the
claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the
matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees are
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees
for comparable legal services. The affidavit must
also separately state the hours by persons other
than attorneys, for time spent, work completed and
hourly rate billed.
A plain reading of the provision clearly shows that the only
hourly rate disclosure required is for non-attorneys.
are clearly not required to state their rate.
average

rate charged

by

LMV f s

Attorneys

Nevertheless, the

attorneys may be determined

by

dividing the total attorney bill by the amount of attorney hours
spent on the case.
and

other

firm

For example, subtraction of the costs of clerks
personnel

from

the

total

requested

bill

of

$19,171.72 (Record, at 528) yields a total attorney fees bill of
$18,862.71.

The total number of hours spent by LMVfs attorney in
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this case was 221.20, as calculated
affidavit.

(Record, at 528).

from the figures in the

This yields an hourly rate, when

divided into the total fee amount, of $85.27 per hour, which is a
reasonable hourly rate for comparable services done in the local
2
legal community. (Record, at 530). Thus, Defendants could have
arrived at the average fee rate by some simple arithmetic on a
calculator.
The case of Talley v. Talley, 739 P. 2d 83 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), cited as support by the Defendants, does not require
explicit disclosure of attorney hourly rates.

In fact, that case

does not even deal with the specific issue raised by Defendants
because the hourly rates of all those involved was explicitly
disclosed in the contested exhibit on attorney fees.

Id., at 84.

Rather, Talley dealt only with the issue of the reasonableness of
the disclosed fees in light of the difficulty of the case and the
result accomplished.

Id.. Since the Defendants' Motion to Strike

the affidavit dealt only with the issue of not explicitly stating
the hourly rate, and did not aver any unreasonableness in the fees

It should be noted that the actual attorney fees awarded
in this case, $13,500.00, was much less than requested. (Compare
Record, at 527-28, with Record, at 542). Dividing the latter
amount, $13,500.00, by the number of attorney hours spent yields
an hourly rate of $61.03, a very low rate in the local legal
community.
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or rate charged, despite the fact that the rate could easily be
obtained by calculator, the Defendants1 appeal of the trial court's
denial of the motion should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The trial court granted summary judgment first as to the issue
of liability, and then as to the issues of damages and attorney
fees.
Since the Defendants are liable as guarantors regardless of
whether the agreement was a lease or a security agreement, this
Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment on the issue
of liability.

It is immaterial whether the agreement was a lease

or a security agreement because the requirement of a commercially
reasonable sale of the vehicles is a requirement of both the Lease
and the Utah U.C.C.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of
damages should also be affirmed because Defendants do not oppose
LMV's affidavits containing facts upon which the trial court relied
in making findings and conclusions supporting the reasonableness
of the sales. Further, Defendants' affidavits only make conclusory
statements that an "offer" was made, while failing to affirmatively
assert that any kind of actual bid or offer was ever communicated
to LMV.

Also, Defendants' affidavits fail to show by specific

evidentiary

facts, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d
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747

(Utah

1985), that there was an offer, or even if there was an offer, how
such offer would have further mitigated LMV f s damages.
Defendants

fail to raise any genuine

Therefore,

issues of material

fact

relating to the commercially reasonable sale of the vehicles or to
mitigation of damages.
Defendants also fail to raise any genuine issues of material
fact and are barred on procedural grounds from raising issues as
to an estoppel arising from impairment of the collateral, or as to
deciding the issue of damages by affidavit without hearing, because
Defendants failed to properly raise these issues before the trial
court.
Finally,

Defendants1

Motion

to Strike

LMV f s

affidavit

on

attorneys fees was properly denied because Defendants failed to
demonstrate how their position is justified under the rules or case
law.
Therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should
be affirm€id as to liability, damages and attorney fees.
Additionally, LMV respectfully requests this Court to award
to LMV additional attorney fees it has accrued in working on this
appeal based on section 18.2 of the Lease, which provides, as one
of the Lessor's remedies, the right to recover any expenses paid
for attorneys' fees, legal expenses and court costs.

(Record, at

23). See, G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 846-47 (Utah
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Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984).
Respectfully submitted,
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

Weston L. Harris
Paul A. Hoffman
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am an attorney licensed to practice
under the laws of the State of Utah and that I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT

to the

following:
D. Frank Wilkins, Esq.
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
175 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Co-counsel for
Defendants and Appellants
Kenneth M. Hisatake, Esq.
1825 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Co-counsel for
Defendants and Appellants
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this
December, 1989.
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26), (38) (1981)

Exhibit B

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501 (1981)

Exhibit C

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504 (1981)

Exhibit D

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507 (1981)

Exhibit E

Rule 4-505(1) Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Exhibit F

"Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement" (Record, at 1331)
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Guaranty of Conlins (Record, at 111)
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Guaranty of Okudas (Record, at 113)

Exhibit I

Notice of Sale (Record, at 328)

Exhibit J

Final Judgment, May 4, 1989 (Record, at 544-51)

EXHIBIT A

70A-1-201

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

(20) "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of
title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank.
(21) To "honor" is to pay or to accept and pay, or where a credit so
engages to purchase or discount a draft complying with the terms
of the credit.
(22) "Insolvency proceedings" includes any assignment for the benefit
of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved.
(23) A person is "insolvent" who either has ceased to pay his debts in
the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they
become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law.
(24) "Money" means a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by
a domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency.
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c)
from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the
time in question he has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar import
refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification may cease to be effective are
not determined by this act.
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another
by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes
to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which
the contract was made or at any other place held out by him
as the place for receipt of such communications.
(27) Notice, knowledge of a notice or notification received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when
it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that
transaction, and in any event from the time when it would have
been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due
diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains
reasonable routines for communicating significant information to
the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual acting for the organization to communicate information
unless such communication is part of his regular duties or unless
he has reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction
would be materially affected by the information.
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GENERAL PROVISIONS

70A-1-201

(28) "Organization" includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership
or association, two or more persons having a joint or common
interest, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(29) "Party," as distinct from "third party," means a person who has
engaged in a transaction or made an agreement within this act.
(30) "Person" includes an individual or an organization (See section
70A-M02).
(31) "Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact must
find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence
is introduced which would support afindingof its nonexistence.
(32) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.
(33) "Purchaser" means a person who takes by purchase.
(34) "Remedy" means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party
is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.
(35) "Representative" includes an agent, an officer of a corporation or
association, and a trustee, executor or administrator of an estate,
or any other person empowered to act for another.
(36) "Rights" includes remedies.
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The
retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 70A-2-401) is limited
in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also
includes any interest of a buyer of account or chattel paper which
is subject to chapter 9. The special property interest of a buyer of
goods on identification of such goods to a contract for sale under
section 70A-2-401 is not a "security interest," but a buyer may also
acquire a "security interest" by complying with chapter 9. Unless
a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title
thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any
event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (section
70A-2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an
option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended
for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional consideration
or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended
for security.
(38) "Send" in connection with any writing or notice means to deposit
in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means
of communication with postage or cost of transmission provided for
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704-1-201

(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)

(45)
(46)

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

and properly addressed and in the case of an instrument to an
address specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there be none
to any address reasonable under the circumstances. The receipt of
any writing or notice within the time at which it would have
arrived if properly sent has the effect of a proper sending.
"Signed" includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a writing.
"Surety" includes guarantor.
"Telegram" includes a message transmitted by radio, teletype,
cable, any mechanical method of transmission, or the like.
"Term" means that portion of an agreement which relates to a particular matter.
"Unauthorized" signature or indorsement means one made without
actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery.
"Value." Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable
instruments and bank collections (sections 70A-3 303, 70A-4-208
and 70A-4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he acquires
them
(a)
in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for
the extension of immediately available credit whether or not
drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is provided
for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(b)
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a preexisting claim; or
(c)
by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for
purchase; or
(d)
generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
"Warehouse receipt" means a receipt issued by a person engaged
in the business of storing goods for hire.
"Written" or "writing" includes printing, typewriting or any other
intentional reduction to tangible form.

History: L 1965, ch. 154, } 1-201; 197?, ch. were impaired by borrower's conduct of his
mink ranching business and his loss by theft
272,}2.
ot a substantial quantity of mink pelts, it
Compiler's Notts.
acted in good faith in invoking acceleration
Tht 1977 amendment inserted the second clause of loan agreement, and the reasonsentence in subtec (9); substituted "of for ableness of its belief in its insecurity was
irrelevant. State Bank of Lehi v. Wooisey
"or" near the beginning of subsee (27); and (1977)
565 P 2d 413.
substituted "buyer of account or chattel
patsr" in the third sentence ot subsec. (37) Lease as security interest.
fsv "buyer of accounts, chattel paper."
The option price was nominal and the lease
with an option to purchase was intended as
Geo* faith.
security where the option price was 10% of
"Good faith" within the meaning of this the original cost of the property, and only
section requires only an honest belief by a 6% of the total lease payments, and at the
creditor that he is insecure, not that the time the option was to be exercised the propbelief be reasonable; where bank's honest erty still had a useful life so as to leave the
belief was that its prospects for repayment lessee with no sensible alternative but to
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EXHIBIT B
SECURED TRANSACTIONS

70A-9-501

is intended as security (section 70A-1-20H37)). However, if it is determined
for other reasons that the consignment or lease is so intended, a security
interest of the consignor or lessor which attaches to the consigned or
leased goods is perfected by such filing.
History? C. 1953, 70A-9-408, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 272, § 34.
., , M *
Compiler • Notes.
Uws 1977, ch. 272, §34 repealed old
section 70A-9-408 (L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-408),

relating to the destruction of old records by
the filing officer, and enacted a new section
70A-9-408.

70A-9-409. Destruction of old records. Unless a filing officer has
notice of an action pending relative thereto, he may remove from the file
and destroy
(1) a lapsed financing statement, a lapsed continuation statement, a
statement of assignment or release relating to either, and any
index of any of them, one year or more after lapse; and
(2) a termination statement and the index on which it is noted, one
year or more after the filing of the termination statement.
History: C. 1953, 70A-9-409, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 272, § 35.
PART 5
DEFAULT
Section
70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers both real and personal
property.
70A-9-502. Collection rights of secured party.
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default — rect of disposition.
70A-9-505. Compulsory disposition of collateral — Acceptance of the c< .:eral as discharge
of obligation.
70A-9-506. Debtor's right to redeem collateral.
70A-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.

70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers
both real and personal property.
(1) When a debtor is in default urider a security agreement, a secured
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement He may reduce his clainvto judgment, foreclose or otherwise
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this
subsection are cumulative.
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those provided in section 70A-9-207.
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70A-9-501

(3)

(4)

(5)

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect to
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable:
(a)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) of
section 70A-9-504 in so far as they require accounting for
surplus proceeds of collateral;
(b)
subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) of
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral;
(c)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with acceptance of collateral as discharge of obligation;
(d)
section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collateral;
and
(e)
subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with the
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the personal
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do not
apply.
When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to the
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of this
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this
chapter.

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, i 9-50l> 1977, ch.
272,J36.
CMpikr's Notes.
Ths 1977 amendment substituted "(subsectioa (3) of section 70A -9-504 and section
70A-9-606)" in the middle of the first paragraph of subsec. (3) for "(subsection (1) of
section 70A-9-506)."
Cross References,
Executions, exemptions from, 78-23-1.
Garnishment, procedure when garnishee is
mortgagee or pledgee, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 640 (o).

Jurisdiction of circuit courts on foreclosure, 78-4-7.
Policy and subject matter of chapter,
70A-9-102.
Real estate mortgages, foreclosure, 78-37-1
et seq.
Rights and duties when collateral is in
secured party's possession, 70A-9-207.
Secured party's right to take possession
and dispose of collateral after default,
70A-9-508, 70A-9-504.
Transactions excluded from chapter,
70A-9-104.
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EXHIBIT C

SECURED TRANSACTIONS
of ths lsst sentence ot subsec. (2); and made
minor changes in punctuation.
Crm+BMhrincf.
Liability of secured party for failure to
comply with part 5 of this chapter,
70A-9-507.
Policy and scope of chapter, 70A-9-102.
Secured party's rights on disposition of
collateral, 70A-9-306.
Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default, 70A-9-5O4.

70A-9-504

Transactions excluded from chapter,
70A-9-104.
Use or disposition of collateral without
accounting permissible, 70A-9-205.
Collateral References,
Secured Transactions <S» 227.
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 104.
69 AmJur 2d 469 to 473, Secured Transactions §§ 580 to 582.

70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or
otherwise.
History: L 1965, ch. 154, § 9-503.
Cross-References.
Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default, 70A-9-504.
Collateral References.
Secured Transactions $=* 228.
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 105.
69 AmJur 2d 473 to 497, Secured Transactions §4 583 to 599.

Validity, under state law, of self-help
repossession of goods pursuant to UCC
i 9 ' 5 0 3 ' 75 A L R 3d 1061.
L * W Review*.
Breach of the Peace and New Mexico's Uniform Commercial Code, 4 Natural Resources
j . g5.
Note, Sniadach, Fuentes and Mitchell: A
Confusing Trilogy and Utah Prejudgment
Remedies, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 536.

DECISIONS UNtiER FORMER LAW
Replevin.
gagee could maintain action in claim and
Where chattel mortgage provided that in delivery to recover such possession after
event default was made in payment of debt default, remedy by foreclosing mortgage not
mortgafts could take possession of property being exclusive. Morgan v. Layton (1922) 60
and proceed to foreclose mortgage, mort- U 280, 208 P 505.

70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after
default — Effect of disposition.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any
commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of
goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2). The proceeds
of disposition shall be applied in the order following to
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(a)

(2)

(3)

(4)

the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for
sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the
secured party;
(b)
the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security
interest under which the disposition is made;
(c)
the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate
security interest in the collateral if written notification of
demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably
furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does
so, the secured party need not comply with his demand.
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying
transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is
entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the
security agreement so provides.
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard
price quotations he may buy at private sale.
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The
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purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this part
or of any judicial proceedings
(a)
in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person
conducting the sale; or
(b)
in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty,
indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a
transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to
his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party.
Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral under this chapter.

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-504; 1977, ch.
272, §38.
Compiler'* Notes.
The 1977 amendment inserted "or lease"
near the beginning of subd. (1) (a); added the
second sentence of subsec. (2) relating to a
sale of accounts or chattel paper; substituted
"if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to
notification of sale" at the end of the third
sentence of subsec. (3) for uand except in the
case of consumer goods to any other person
who has a security interest in the collateral
and who has duly filed a financing statement
indexed in the name of the debtor in this
state or who is known by the secured party
to have a security interest in the collateral";
and inserted the fourth sentence of subsec.
(3) relating to notification of other secured
parties.
Cross- References.
Collateral not owned by debtor, 70A-9-112.
Compulsory disposition of collateral,
70A-9-505.
Contract for sale of goods, breach by
buyer, resale by seller, 70A-2-706.
Policy and subject matter of chapter/
70A-9-102.
Secured party's liability for failure to comply with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507.

Notice of disposition.
Secured party is barred from obtaining a
deficiency judgment after a disposition of the
property securing the debt where no notice of
the disposition was given the debtor and the
disposition was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. FMA Financial
Corp. v. Pro-Printers (1979) 590 P 2d 803.
Notice of sale.
Secured party should give notice of time
and place of sale of the collateral to a
guarantor of the debt. Zions First Nat. Bank
v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 2d 1031.
Collateral References.
Secured Transactions o=> 229 to 237, 240.
79 CJS Supp. Secu:-d Transactions §§106
to 113.
69 AmJur 2d 499 'o 532, Secured Transactions §§ 602 to 624.
Rights and duties o: parties to conditional
sales contract as to resale of repossessed
property, 49 ALR 2d 15.
Uniform Commercial Code; burden of proof
as to commercially reasonable disposition of
collateral, 59 ALR 3d 369.
Uniform Commercial Code: failure of
secured creditor to give required notice of
disposition of collateral as bar to deficiency
judgment, 59 ALR 3d 401.
What constitutes a "public sale," 4 ALR 2d
575.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
F o r s d a a w by advertisement or sale — power, where it appeared that mortgaged
Perishable property or livestock.
property was perishable, or that it was liveIn proceeding under former section 9-1-6, stock and that cost of feeding and keeping it
relating to mortgagor's right to enjoin fore- pending action would be great, to call on
closure by advertisement and sale, court had mortgagor to consent to sale or furnish
indemnity bond to hold mortgagee harmless.
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Zum Btftnrnr^Secured party's liability for failure to com)ly with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507.
Secured party's right to dispose of collat,rai after default, 70A-9-504.
n n —-1 Reference*.
CoU**r*l References
Secured Transactions <S=» 238, 239.

70A-9-507

79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 114,
j>- . . 9. ^ 2 t o 5 3 7 Secured T r a n s .
*? A f / S L ^ ^
'
a c t l o n s § § 6 2 5 t 0 627
J
Construction and operation of UCC § 9-505
M authorizing secured party in possession of
collateral to retain it in satisfaction of obhga tion, 55 ALR 3d 651.
u

70A-9-506, Debtor's right to redeem collateral. At any time before
he
secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for
:
ts disposition under section 70A-9-504 or before the obligation has been
lischarged under section 70A-9-505 (2) the debtor or any other secured
)arty may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the colateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral
ts well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in
•etaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging
'or the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not prohibted by law, his reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses.
Hiftory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-506.
;roee-Ref«rencee,
''r
i
A•*•
*
ii * i
Compulsory disposition of collateral,
°£
A -,'
• u* • j .
/ ..
Secured party s right to dispose of collatral, 70A-9-504.

Collateral Reference*,
S ? f i 2 d o T r M ? c t i o i l J T 2ih ,,,«
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 118.
6 9 A m J u r 2d 550 to 559, Secured Transactions §J 639 to 648.

70A-9-507, Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this
>art.
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this part disposition may be
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the
disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made known to the
secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the
provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the
debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than
the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount
of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the
cash price.
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at
a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale
was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured
party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such
market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
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type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable
manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types
of disposition. A disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be
commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that
any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate
that any disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable.
Hiitory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-507.
Croat-Reference*.
Obligation of good faith, 70A-1-203.
Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default, 70A-9-504.
Title to collateral immaterial, 70A-9-202.
Deficiency judgment.
Secured party is barred from obtaining a
deficiency judgment after a disposition, pursuant to 70A-9-504, of the property securing
the debt where no notice of the disposition
was given the debtor and the disposition was
not conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner, FMA Financial Corp. v. ProPrinters (1979) 590 P 2d 803.
Disposition not made in commercially
reasonable manner.
Secured party's disposition of the collateral was not made in a commercially reasonable manner, and secured party was liable to
debtor for the value of debtor's equity in the

collateral, where secured party failed to give
debtor notice of the disposition and sold the
collateral for a price equal to the balance due
on the promissory note when the fair market
value of the collateral was more than four
times that amount. Maas v. Allred (1978) 577
P 2d 127.
Failure to give notice of sale of collateral
Failure by secured party to give debtor
notice of time and place of sale of the collateral does not release debtor from his obligation to pay any deficiency debt still existing after the sale; but debtor can recover for
any loss caused by the failure to so notify.
Zions First Nat. Bank v. Hurst (1977) 570 P
2d 1031.
Collateral References.
Secured Transactions <£» 225, 242, 243.
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 119.
69 Arr.Jur 2d 559 to 567, Secured Transactions $$647 to 653.

CHAPTER 10
EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER
Section
70A-10-101.
70A-10-102.
70A-10-103.
70A-10-104.

Effective date.
Specific repealer — Provision for transition.
General repealer.
Laws not repealed.

70A-10-101. Effective date. This act shall become effective at midnight
on December 31st, 1965. It applies to transactions entered into and events
occurring after that date.
History: L. 1966, ch. 154, § 10-101.

70A-10-102. Specific repealer — Provision for transition.
(1) The following acts and all other acts and parts of acts inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed:
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Title 44, U.C.A., 1953;
350

103

OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Rule 4-505

the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within (5) days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.

Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support
of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees are
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed.
(2) If the fee arrangement with the client is other than at an hourly rate an
affidavit of the client or correspondence from the client shall be filed with the

Rule 4-506
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court setting forth the terms and conditions of the arrangement, whether a
flat rate or contingent fee, or the percentage of funds recovered or dealt with.
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred
in pursuit of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they
conform to the provisions of this rule.

Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases*
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in
civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) An attorney may withdraw as counsel of record in all cases except where
withdrawal would result in a delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not
withdraw without the approval of the court.
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written notice of the
withdrawal must be served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial date.
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the
unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings
against the client.

Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's sale.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales.
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of funds on
trustee's sales.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the
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PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT

\

THIS AGREEMENT, made the
between

29th

day oi

December
,

LMV LEASING, INC., 121 Freeport Road, Pittsburgh, PA

M±^

by and
m

15238

hereinafter called "Lessor"
A
N
XHI«
O
MCQ^DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL
1380 W. North Temple Street, Salt Lake City, UT

84116

hereinaiter called "Lessee".
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, Lessee contemplates the leasing oi various vehicles; and
WHEREAS, Lessor is willing to lease said vehicles upon the terms and conditions hereinaiter
set forth;

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows*
i.
DEFINITIONS. As herein used*
1.1 "Accounting Form" is a record with respect to a specific vehicle* Each
Accounting Form will show the date of delivery of the vehicle, the make,
manufacturer, model number, serial number, Agreed Price, Rental Payment,
Base Lease Term in months, Interim Rental, Interim Lease Term, location and
such other applicable details as Lessor and Lessee may desire.
1.2 "Acquisition Fee - is a charge made by Lessor for procuring each vehicle. The
amount and manner of payment are set forth in Schedule "A".
1.3 "Administrative Fee19 is a monthly service charge payable by Lessee to Lessor;
agreed upon between Lessor and Lessee as set forth in Schedule "A".
l.» "Agreed Price* of any vehicle is determined as set forth in Schedule "A",
1.5 "Base Lease Term-, with respect to any vehicle* is the period commencing on the
15th day of the month following the month in which such vehicle is first
delivered to Lessee and ending on the Uth day of the month identified in the
Purchase Order ae the last month of the Base Lease Term.
1.6 "Basic Rent", when used* combines and replaces Financing Charge11 and "Monthly
Depreciation*, and, if used, is as set forth in Schedule "A".
1.7 "book Value* of any vehicle is the Agreed Price less the aggreg*** Monthly
1.1
1.9
1.10

"Bunded Rental" is a charge made by Lessor and payable by Lessee as set forth
in Schedule "A* for continuing to lease any vehicle beyond the Base Lease Term
theroi.
"Financing Charge* is a component of the monthly Rental Payment determined
as set forth in Schedule "A",
"Interim Lease Term", with respect to any vehicle, is (a) in the case of delivery
by the manufacturer, the period commencing on the 10th day following the
shipping date (as set forth in the manufacturer's invoice, a copy of which shall be
delivered to Lessee) of such vehicle by the manufacturer thereof and, in the case
of delivery by anyone other than the manufacturer, commencing on the date of
delivery of such vehicle to Lessee and ending, in each case, on the

common
tnt of tht Bait Ltaat Term fo: uch vehicle (tht "Initial
Interim Ltaat Term") plot (b) tht period, if tnyf commencing on tht
day on which Lttttt rtturnt auch vthiclt to Ltttor in conntctlon vith
Leeeee'e cxerclee of any option to terminate tht ltaat of auch
vehicle prior to tht regularly achtdult expiration of tht Baat Ltaat
Tent thtrtof (provided that on auch day Ltaatt ptya to Ltaaor tht
monthly ttntal Payment dut on auch data, if any), and andlng on tht
day cm vhich Ltttor thai I have rtctlvtd tht ntt procttda of aala of
emefc vthiclt togtthtr with tny ttmlnatlon payment dua undtr Stction
19 from Ltaatt vith rtaptct to auch aala tht ("Second Inttrla Ltaat
Term").
1.11

1.12

1.13

1.14

1.15

1.16.
1.17

1.1ft

"Interim Ranta1" la tht amount payablt by Laaatt to Laaaor vith
rtaptct to tht ltaat of any vahiclt during tht Inttrim Ltaat Term
thtrtof and ahall bt tqual to tha Financing Charge multiplied by tht
unamortized balanct of tht Agrttd Price, computed on tht baaia of a
360-day ytar and tvtlvt 30-day montha, for tht actual numbtr of days
involved.
"Monthly Depreciation1' for any vehicle la that portion of the monthly
Rental Payment vhich la used to red ce the Agreed Price to Book
Value.
"Overall Leaae Term" vith reapect to any vehicle la the period
conalatlng of the Interim Leaae Term and the Baae Leaae Term thereof;
provided, hovever, that it alao lncludea any other period, whether
prior to the Interim Leaae Term or the aubaequent to the expiration
or other termination of the 3M$9 Leaae Term or the Interim Leaae
Term, aa the caae may be, during vhich Leaaee haa poaaeeaion of auch
vehicle (including any period contemplated by Section 3.4.
"Purchaae Order" la a form aupplled or approved by Leaaor and algned
(or electronically entered) by Leaaee that speciflea the Leaaee'a
preference aa to delivery area, date of delivery, vehicle to be
furnished, the make, manufacturer, model number, color, acceeaorlee,
optional iteme and any other featurea to bt furniahed and the number
of montha in tht Baae Leaae Term.
"ttntal Payment11 ia tht amount payable by Leaaee to Leaaor each month
for the uae of a specific vehicle during the Bapp Leaae Term thereof
and conalata of, but la not neceaaarily limited tot
Monthly Depreciation (1.12 above)
Baalc tent (1.6 above)
Financing Charge (1.9 above)
Maintenance (6 belov)
Admlniatratlve Fee (1.3 above)
Taxea and Feea (7 belov)
"Settlement Fee19 la. a charge made by Leeeor at termination of the
leaae of each vehicle at aet forth in Schedule "A".
"Termination Value", vith reapect to any vehicle, ia the amount
determined in accordance vith Bxhlbit "I" and payable pursuant to
Section 19.
"Vehicle19 meant ont or mort automoblltt, vane, trucka or similar
item*.
>

2.1

2.2

•. -

-

Leeeor hereby leaaee to Leaaee, and the Leeeee hereby leaaee from
Leeeor, the vehlclee deecribed in Accounting Forme delivered and/or
to be delivered upon the terme and conditlone aet forth in thla
Agreement, ae aupplamented vith reapect to each vehicle by the terma
and conditlone aet forth in the appropriate Accounting Fore
identifying auch vehicle.
The vehlclee to be leaaed hereunder ahall be thoae identified an<
apecified in Purchaae Orders placed by Leeeee vith Leaaor from tiai
to time and vhich Leaaor undertakee to have delivered to Leaaee. Ii
the event the ueual supplier of any particular vehicle la unable t<
provide the aame In time to meet the delivery date apecified b
Leeeee, Leeeor and Leaaee ahall agree on eubetituted action
~- * w - otreumatance.
Upon delivery of any vehicle

3.

t.

deliver to Ussor a dalivtry rtctipt signed by tha individual to whom dalivtry is
authorizad "by Usstt* Upon dalivtry of a vehidt to Lessee, Ussor and Ltssea
shall execute an Accounting Form with rtsptct to such vehicle. Except as
spaciiicaily modiiiad with rtsptct to any vahicia by tha ttrms and conditions sat
forth in tha appropriate Accounting Form idantifying such vehicle, all of tha
ttrms and conditions of this Agrttmtnt shall govarn tha rights and obligations of
Ltssor and Lessee. Whatavar rtftrtnct is mada to "this Agrttmtnt11 it shall ba
dttmtd to include, as required, tha ona or mora Accounting Forms idantifying
tha vahicia.
2.3 Each vahicia shall at all timas ba tha sola and axdusivt proptrty of Ltssor, and
Ltssaa shall hava no right, titla or inttrtst tharain txctpt tha right to use tha
samt as htrtin provided. As long as Ltssaa is not in dafault in any obligation to
Lessor, Lassaa may use tha vehicles in tha rtgular course of its business (or any
lawful purpose.
TERM
3.1 Tha Base Lease Term with respect to any vehicle is set forth in the Accounting
Form relating thereto.
3.2 This Agreement shall remain in effect until such time as no further vehicles are
subject hereto and until Lessee has satisfied in full all of its obligations to Lessor
with respect to any vehicle at any time leased hereunder. Provided that no
Event of Default shall have occurred and ba continuing, tha termination of this
Agreement in respect of any vehicle shall not affect any other vehicle subject
hereto at the time of such termination and any such other vehicle shall remain
subject to the terms of this Agreement and tha appropriata Accounting Form
idantifying such other vehicle.
3.3 Lessee may retire from service any vehicle leased pursuant to this Agreement by
giving to Lessor written notice and surrendering possession of such vehicle to
Lessor at tha point where samt was originally delivered to Lessee, or at such
other point as may ba mutually agreed upon. Tha iaese ae to such vahicia shall
terminate upon the data such vehicle is sold by Leseor pursuant to Section 19,
subject, however, to tha provisions hereof including, but not limited to, Sections
16 and 19.
3.* At Lessee's option any vehicle may ba continuad in sarvica beyond the Base
Lease Term thereof, in which event (a) tha monthly rental due therefor during
such continuation will ba tha Extended Rental and (b) no Interim Rental will ba
payabla with respect to any Second Interim Leasa Term ol such vehicle.
RENTAL PAYMENTS
4.1 Lessee agrees to pay Leseor, as rent tor each vahicia leased hereunder, Interim
Rental and monthly Rental Payments, and any other charges due, during each
taaMh o i tha Overall Lease Term with respect to such vehicle in such amounts as
mm sat fort* In tha Accounting Form relating to such vahicia and are calculated
( U K o r d a n c e with methods o! computation sat forth in Schedule "A9. With
rSpdct to each vehicle, all rent and other charges shall ba due and payabla on or
befora tha fifteenth (15th) day of each month during tha Overall Leasa Term
thereof,
commencing with the first such fifteenth 113th) day after tha
commencement of the Interim Leasa Term with respect to such vehicle. A
LATE CHARGE OF 2% OF THE AMOUNT DUE WITH A MINIMUM CHARGE OF
32.00 WILL BE ADDED TO EACH SUCH PAYMENT UNPAID ON THE DUE
DATE AND THE SAME CHARGE WILL BE AODED FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT
MONTH OR PART THEREOF ON WHICH SUCH PAYMENT REMAINS UNPAID.

-3-

t.2
4.3

With respect to any vehicle returned to Lessor pursuant to Section 3.3, monthly
Rental Payments snail cease on the day alter the return date.
Interim Rdntai and monthly Rental Payments shell be paid to Ussor *t the
address set forth above or such other address as Ussor shall provide to Lessee.

>.

WARRANTIES.
LESSOR, NOT BEING THE MANUFACTURER OR A DISTRIBUTOR OF THE
VEHICLES NOR THE MANUFACTURER'S OR A DISTRIBUTOR'S AGENT, MAKES NO
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION OF ANY KINO WHATSOEVER
WITH RESPECT TO ANY VEHICLE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TOt
THE
MERCHANTABILITY OF THE VEHICLE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE) THE DESIGN OR CONDITION OF THE VEHICLE) THE QUALITY OR CAPACITY
OF THE VEHICLE) THE WORKMANSHIP IN THE VEHICLE) COMPLIANCE OF THE
VEHICLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ANY LAW, RULE, SPECIFICATION OR
CONTRACT PERTAINING THERETO) PATENT INFRINGEMENT) IT BEING AGREED THAT
THE VEHICLES ARE LEASEO "AS IS". WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE
FOREGOING, LESSOR SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEFECTS, EITHER LATENT OR
PATENT IN ANY VEHICLE, OR FOR ANY DIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE
THEREFROM, OR FOR ANY LOSS OF USE THEROF OR FOR ANY INTERRUPTION IN
LESSEE'S BUSINESS BY ITS INABILITY TO USE ANY VEHICLE FOR ANY REASON
WHATSOEVER.
Lessee will be subrogated to Lessor's claims, if any, against the
manuiacturer or supplier of any vehicle for breach oi any warranty or representation, by
such manufacturers or suppliers and, upon written request from Lessee, Lessor shall take all
reasonable action requested by Lessee to enforce any such warranty, express or implied,
issued on or applicable to any vehicle which is enforceable by Ussor in its own name,
provided, however, that (a) no Event of Default has occurred and (b) Ussor shall not be
obligated to take any action to enforce any such warranty unless Lessee shall pay ail
expenses in connection therewith. Upon request by Ussor, Lessee shall pay Ussor's
reasonably estimated costs in advance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Lessee's obligations
to pay the Interim Rental, monthly Rental Payments and other charges under this
Agreement shall be and are absolute and unconditional. All proceeds of any such warranty
recovered from the manufacturer or supplier of a vehicle shall first be used to repair the
affected vehicle.
6.

MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OPERATING EXPENSES AND RETURN OF VEHICLES.
6.1 Unless otherwise specified in a schedule hereto separately signed by Lessor,
Lessee will pay for all maintenance and repairs to keep the vehicles in good
working order and condition and any other expenses associated with operating
the vehicles* Leasee will service the vehicles according to the manufacturers'
recommendations as outlined in the owner's manual and the maintenance
schedule folder accompanying each vehicle.
6^2 Lessee will return each vehicle at the end of the lease thereof in good condition
with no excessive wear and tear including, among other things* (1) no glass
breakage or discoloration, (2) no damage or deterioration of body, fenders, metal
work, trim or paint, (3) no original equipment including wheel covers or tires
(including spare) that are missing or not in safe condition, (6) no damage from
flood water, hail, or sand, and (7) no damage or alteration that makes the vehicle
either unsafe or unlawful to operate.
6.3 Lessee shall comply with any and all governmental requirements affecting th«
maintenance, operation or use of each of the vehicles including, without
limitation, any changes or safeguards therein to keep each of the vehicles in suet
compliance. Any replacement parts, changes in or improvements to each of th<
vehicles shall become and remain the property of Lessor.

REGBTRATIONi TAXES AND INSPECTION.
responsible for payment for titling, registration and licensing and ail
"vetftdes required by any govtrnmtnt authority during the overall lease
pay for all excise, sale, viae, personal property, gross receipts, and other
assessed by federal, state or local governments, during the Overall Lease
Term whether with respect to this Agreement or the ownership, lease, use or operation of
the vehicle, or with respect to the receipt of rental and other payments by Lessor, except
those taxes levied on the net income of the Lessor, provided that the foregoing exception
shall not apply to any such net income taxes which are in substitution for, or relieve the
Lessee from the payment of, taxes which it would otherwise be obligated to pay or
reimburse. Lessee shall comply with all federal, state, county and municipal statutes,
ordinances, rules, and regulations which may be applicable to the leasing, use, insuring,
condition, maintenance or operation of the vehicles hereunder, and shall prepare and furnish
to Lessor ail documents, returns, or forms legally required thereunder. Lessee shall provide
all drivers or other operators of the vehicles and shall be soiey responsible for any and all
fines, penalties and forfeitures (including, without limitation, the confiscation of any of the
vehicles) arising out of or due to the use, operation, condition, maintenance or insuring of
each of the vehicles in violation of any law, regulation, statute or similar requirement of
any governmental authority*
8-

DELIVERY
5.1 Lessor will not be responsible for any loss resulting ffrom delay in delivery of any
vehicle.
8.2 Lessee hereby warrants to Lessor that any person accepting delivery of any
vehicle has authority to do so on behalf of Lessee and that the signature of such
person on any document executed in connection herewith shall be binding on
Lessee.

9.

USE.
9.1 Lessee will allow only licensed drivers to operate the vehicles and Lessee agrees
that Lessee (if a natural person) and all such licensed drivers are drivers in good
standing under the laws of the state in which they are licensed and have not
within the past five (J) years had any driver's license suspended or revoked or had
any insurance premium adjusted because of a poor driving record.
9.2 Lessee will keep the vehicles free of all fines, liens and encumbrances. If Lessor
receives notice of any motor vehicle violation relating to any vehicle, Lessor
may charge Lessee a reasonable service charge, as determined by Lessor from
time to time, for processing such notice. Nothing in this Section 9.2 shall
require Lessor, however, to take any action with respect to such notice.
9.3 lessee will not use the vehicles illegally, improperly or for hire, or permit such
9«*
93
9.6
9.7

10.

Leesee will not use the vehicles to pull trailers unless designed for that purpose.
Loose*, will not remove the vehicles from the continental United States.
Lessee will not alter, mark or install equipment in the vehicles without Lessor's
written consent.
Lessee will not change the locations at which the vehicles are permanently
garaged without prior notification to Lessor of such relocation.

OWNERSHIP.
10.1 This Agreement is a lease only and Lessor remains the owner of the vehicle*
This Agreement is a net lease and Lessee shall not be entitled to any abatement
of Interim Rentals, Rental Payments or other amounts payable hereunder or
reduction thereof, including, but not limited to, abatements or reductions due to
any present or future claims of Lessee against Lessor under this Agreement or
•3-

otherwise, or against the manufacturer or vendor of the vehicles nor, except as
otherwise expressly provided herein, shall this Agreement terminate, or the
respective obligations of Lessor or Lessee be otherwise affected, by reason of
any defect in.or damage to or loss or destruction of all or any of the vehicles
from whatsoever cause, the taking or requisitioning of all or any vehicles by
condemnation or otherwise, the prohibition by law of Lessee's use of ail or any
vehicles, the interference with such use by any private person or corporation, the
invalidity or unenforceability or lack of due authorization or other infirmity of
this Agreement, or lack of right, power or authority of Lessor to enter into this
Agreement, or for any other cause whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing,
any present or future law to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the intention
of the parties hereto that the rents and other amounts payable by Lessee
hereunder shall continue to be payable in all events unless the obligation to pay
the same shall be terminated pursuant to the terms hereof.
10.2 Lessee will not transfer, sublease, or rent any of the vehicles or do anything to
interfere with Lessor's ownership of the vehicles. Lessee agrees that this Lease
will be treated as a true lease for federal income tax purposes and that unless
there is a written agreement with Lessor to the contrary, Lessor viM receive all1'
of the tax and other benefits of ownership of the vehicles ana* Lessee will not
claim any depreciation or ACRS deductions or investment tax credits with
respect to the vehicles. Lessee will, from time to time, execute such statements
as may be requested by Lessor in order to confirm Lessor's ownership of the
vehicles and Lessor's right to claim such tax benefits with respect thereto. •
11.

RISK OP LOSS AND INSURANCE.
All risks of loss from public liability, damage to property or third persons, or damage
to each vehicle, whether caused by an unavoidable casualty, accident, abuse or misuse
thereof by Lessee, its employees, agents or others, shall be borne by Lessee. Lessee shall

ee«efeehe«e<i«e»eji4>aee«lieie«^4MMeeaf» with a responsible qualified insurance company
acceptable to Lessor, protecting the interests of Lessor and Lessee against liability tor
damages for personal injury or death, property damage to others, or damage to the vehicles
wherever such vehicles may be used or be located, ail as set forth in Schedule "A". Said
insurance shall not be excess over other coverage, but shall be primary insurance up to and
including the limits set forth in Schedule"A». Said insurance policies shall be satisfactory to
Lessor as to form and substance, shall be payable to Lessor or its assigns as their interests
may appear and shall name Lessor as an additional named insured without liability for
premiums. Said policies shall provide for at least ten (10) days written notice of
cancellation to Lessor or it* assigns and Lessee shall furnish certificates, policies o»
endorsements to Lessor or any such assigns as proof of such insurance. Lessor or its assign
may act aa attorney for Lessee in making, adjusting or settling any claims under an]
insurance) policies insuring the vehicles. Lessee assigns to Lessor all of its right, title, ant
interest to ai*y insurance policies insuring the vehicles, including all rights to receive ttv
proceeds of Insurance not in excess of the unpaid obligations under this Lease, and direct
any insurer to pay ail such proceeds directly to Lessor or its assigns and authorizes Lessor o
its assigns to endorse Lessee's name on any draft for such proceeds. No such loss, damagi
theft or eaaeruction of any vehicle* in whole or part, shall Impair the obligations of Lesss
under that Agreement, ail of wMch shall continue at full force and effect subject to Lessee
right to terminate} the lease of any vehicle pursuant to Section 3.3. After compliance wii
the foregoing to Lessor's satisfaction, and provided no Event of Default has occurred and
continuing, Lessee shall be subrogated to Lessor's rights with respect to any insurant
policies or claims for reimbursement by others with respect to such loss.

12*

G E N U A L INDEMNITY.
Lessee assumes liability for and hereby agrees to indamnify, protactf and save and
kaap harmless Lassorf its afants* servants, succassors and assigns from and against all
ciaimst whether or not dua in whola or in part to any act or omission or othar negligence of
Lassor, its agents, servants, successors, assigns or any of thair ampioyeasf for losses,
damagast injuries, costs, expenses, attorneys1 faas and court costs arising out of tha usaf
condition (including, but not limitad to9 latant and othar defects, whathar or not
discovarabla by it), or operation of any vehicle, ragardlass of whara, how and by whom
operated or arising out of or resulting from tha condition of tha vehicles sold or disposed of
after use by Lessee or, if Lessee shall not take delivery of any vehicle hereunder, after
Lessee shall have signed (or electronically entered) a Purchase Order with respect to such
vehicle arising out of or resulting from any claims that the manufacturer or supplier of such
vehicle may assert against Lessor with respect to such Purchase Order • Lessee shall
assume the settlement of, and the defense of any suit or suits, or other legal proceedings
brought to enforce all such losses, damages, injuries, claims, demands and expenses, and
shall pay all judgments entered in any such suit or suits or other legal proceedings. The
indemnities and assumptions of liabilities and obligations herein provided for shall continue
in full force and effect from and after the date of Lessee's execution of this Agreement,
notwithstanding the subsequent termination hereof by expiration of time, by operation of
law, or otherwise* Lessee shall indemnify, protect and save and keep harmless Lessor, its
agents, servants, successors and assigns from and against all liability arising under Title IV
of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, P.U 92-313, and similar laws of any
other jurisdiction relating to false or inaccurate odometer readings* Lessee hereby
represents and warrants that this Agreement constitutes a "qualified motor vehicle
operating agreement*, as defined in Section 161 (f) (13) of the Internal Revenue Code, and
shall indemnify Lessor in the event of the incorrectness of such representation and warranty
pursuant to this Section 12. Lessee is an independent contractor and nothing contained in
the Agreement shall authorize Lessee or any other person to operate any vehicle so as to
incur or impose any liability or obligation for or on behalf of Lessor*
13.

U.

ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE BY LESSEE* CHANGE IN CONTROL.
13.1 Without Lessor's prior written consent. Lessee may not, by operation or law or
otherwise; (a) assign, transfer, pledge} hypothecate or otherwise dispose of this
Agreement orany i n v e s t therein or (b) sublet or lend the vehicles or permit the
same to be used by anyone'other than Lessee or Lessee's employees, except that,
following written notice to Lessor, it may sublet the same to any of its present
or future subsidiaries or affiliated companies, but every such sublease shall be
subject and subordinate to the terms of this Agreement and shall in no event
relieve Leasee ot its obligations hereunder, and each such sublessee shall, in
addition, agree in writing with Lessor at the time of the sublease to be bound by
the terms and conditions hereof •
13.2 t ^ i n j ! * change in control of Lssaea, such change in control shall be deemed
^ ^ ^ K S t o a t e of this Agreement for purposes of Section 13.1. In addition to
^ ^ ^ r o a l change ol control, a change in control shall be deemed to occurred if,
OTB| time, the ownership ol more than 30 percent of either the voting power of
* f e f c e i the equity interests in Lessee is different than on the date hereof.

ASSIGNMENT BY LESSOR.
For the purpose of providing funds for financing the purchase of vehicles to be leased
hereunder, or for any other purpose, Lessor may assign to any third party all or any part of
its right, title and interest in and to this Agreement and in and to the vehicles and monies
due and to become due to the Lessor hereunder. In such event all the provisions of this
-7-

Agrttmtnt lor tht btntfit of Ltssor shallf to tht txttnt of tht rights assigntd, inert to tht
btntf it ol and may, to such txttnt, bt txtrcistd by or on bthtlf of such third party, and ail
rtntal paymtnu and othtr amounts dut and to btcomt dut undtr this Agrttmtnt and
assigntd to such third party, upon notict by Ltssor or assigntt to Ltsstt, shall bt paid
dirtctly to such third party, and THE RIGHT* OP SUCH ASSIGNEE SHALL NOT BE
SUBJECT TO ANY DEFENSE, COUNTERCLAIM OR SET-OFF WHICH LESSEE MAY HAVE
AGAINST LESSOR, for any claim of tht Ltsstt whatsoavtr; whtthtr arising from brtach of
warranty or rtprtstmation relating to any vthidt, or arising from tht ttrmination of this
Agrttmtnt or of any ltast of any vthiclt htrtundtr, or arising from tht brtach or failure of
Ltssor to obstrvt or ptrform any of tht ttrms or provisions of this Agrttmtnt or of any
othtr agrttmtnt or transaction whatsoavtr bttwttn Ltssor and tht Ltsstt. Ltsstt agrees
to makt prompt payment to such third party of tht rentals and othtr amounts so assigntd
even though bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangemtnt, insolvency, liquidation or dissolution
proceedings are instituted by or against tht Ltssor and regardless of whtthtr a trustee or
receiver in any such proceedings shall assume or reject this Agretmtnt. In tht tvent of such
assignment, tht liability of Ltsstt to pay such third party tht full amount of tht rental and
othtr sums assigntd with respect to each vehicle htrtundtr shall not bt terminated,
notwithstanding anything her tin containtd to tht contrary, unites (1) Ltsstt shall have paid
such third party all assigntd sums dut htrtundtr with rtsptct to such vthiclt or (2) such
third party or Ltssor shall have furnished to Ltsstt a releast executed by such third party
in substantially tht following forms
"The vthiclt herein dtscribtd has been rtltastd from tht assignment madt by
LMV LEASING, INC, to tht undtrsigntd". (Signature of third party or
authorized offictr to bt addtd.)
Such third party shall have no obligation or liabilities undtr this Agrttmtnt by rtason of or
arising out of such assignment, nor shall such third party bt required or obligated in any
manner to ptrform or fulfill any dutits or obligations of tht Ltssor undtr this Agreement*
15.

LESSOR'S PERFORMANCE OF LESSEE OBLIGATIONS
If Ltsstt shall fail to duly and promptly ptrform any of its obligations undtr this
Agrttmtnt with rtsptct to any vthiclt, Ltssor may (at its option) ptrform any act or make
any payment which Lessor dttma ntctssary for tht mainttnanct and prtstrvation of sudi
vthiclt and Ltssor4* titit thereto, including paymtnu for satisfaction of liens, repairs,
taxes, ltvies and insuranca and all sums so paid or incurred by Ltssor, togtthtr with inttresi
at tht maximum rata ptrmitttd by law from tht data of paymtnt, and any reasonable lega
feta incurred by Ltssor in connection therewith shall bt additional amounts dut undtr thi*
Agirttmtnt and payablt by Ltsstt to Ltssor on demand* Tht ptrformanca of any act o
paymtnt by Ltssor as afortsaid shall not bt detmtd a waiver or rtitast of any obligation o
dtf auit on tht part of Lente.
16.

TAXMXENMTY.
ThitStctioft J6 applias unltsa othtrwist sptcilitd in Exhibit "P.
16.1 ii U) for any rtason othtr than a Law Changt (aa hartinafttr dtfintd) Lessor
not entitled to claim or shall have reduced or disallowed all or any portion of tt
investment tax credit or tht dtprtciation or ACRS daductions dtscribtd
Exhibit T ("Tax Btntfits") or any such Tax Btntf its art recaptured or defer n
in whol* or in part pursuant to tht Internal Revenue Code of 1934, as amended
"Tax Btntfits Loss49) or (b) thart occurs a Law Changt that would rtsult in
reduction of Lessor's altar-tax yitid from thtteasingof any vthiclt htrtundtr
"Law Changt Loss19), than Lessee shall pay to Lessor as additional rent su
amount as, after deduction of ail taxts required to bt paid by Ltssor in rtsp*
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of tht receipt thtreof undtr tht laws of any govtrnmtntti or taxing authority in
tht Unittd Statts. ihaii bt required to causa Lessor's not rtturn and cash flow to
equal tht ntt retuw and cash flow that would havt bttn availablt to Lessor if it
(i) Lessor had bttn tntitltd to tht utilization oi tht Tax Btntfits or (ii) such Law
Changt had not occurred (in either cast, tht "Tax Indemnity Amount"), For
purposes hereof, "Law Change11 means any amendment of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1934 that is enacted alter the date on which the Overall Lease Term
commences as to a particular vehicle*
16.2 Lessor shall be responsible forf and shall not be entitled to a payment *y Lessee
on account of, any Tax Benefits Loss arising solely as a direct result of the
occurrence of any one or more of the following events* (i) the failure of Lessor
to timely and properly claim Tax Benefits (unless tax counsel to Lessor shall
have advised it that such Tax Benefits cannot properly be claimed for any
vehicle on the tax return of Lessor (or the consolidated Federal taxpayer group
of which Lessor is a part); or (ii) the failure of Lessor (or the consolidated
Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to have sufficient taxable
income before depreciation or ACR5 deductions with respect to the vehicles to
offset tht full amount of any such depreciation or ACRS deduction or to have
sufficient tax liability to utilize the investment tax credit with respect to the
vehicles.
16.3 Lessor promptly shall notify Lessee in writing of any Tax Benefits Loss or Law
Change Loss and of tht Tax Indemnity Amount relating thereto and Lessee shall
pay to Lessor such Tax Indemnity Amount wttfiin thirty (30) days of such notice.
For purposes of this Stction 16f a Tax OtfwOTtf Loss shall occur upon the earliest
of (i) tht happening ol any event (such at a changt in get ot any vehicle or a
disposition of a vehicle by Lessor after Lessee has terminated tht lease oi such
vehicle before tht end of tht Bast Lease Term thtrtoft which may cause such
Tax Benefits Loss} (ii) the payment by Lessor (or the consolidated Federal
taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to tht Internal Revenue Service or a
state or local taxing authority of tht tax increase resulting from such Tax
Benefits Loss} or (Ui) tht adjustment of the tax return of Lessor (or the
consolidated Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) by an examining
agent to reflect such Tax benefits Loss; for purposes hereof» a Law Change Loss
shall occur upon tht effective date of such Law Change*
16.* Notwithstanding tht foregoing, following tht salt or othtr disposition of a
vehicle by Leeeor, if no Tax Benefits Lose has previously occurred with respect
to such vthidtt a Tax Benefits Loos shall (unless Lessee shell have paid in full
tht Termination Value of such vehicle pursuant to Stction 19) bt deemed to havt
resulted iftd tht Tax indemnity Amount with respect thereto shall bt that
amount determined by multiplying tht factor set forth on Exhibit T by the
16.5 LteettS obligations undtr this Stction shall survive the termination of this
Agrytmtnt*
17.

eVQQJjOr DEFAULT.
Less** diall bt in default under this Agreement with respect to all vehicles acquired
hereunder upen the happening oi any of the following events or conditions ("Events of
Default")}
17.1 Default by Lessee in payment ol any Interim Rental or Rental Payment or any
other indebtedness or obligation now or hereafter owed by Lessee to Lessor
under this Agreement or otherwise}

-9-

17J Deiault In the performance of any obligation, covenant or liability contained in
this Agreement or any other agreement or document with Lessor, and the
continuance of such default for ten (10) consecutive days after written notice
thereof by Lessor to Lessee;
17J Any warranty, representation or statement made or furnished to Lessor by or on
behalf of Lessee or any permitted sublessee proves to have been false in any
material respect when made or furnished)
17.* Loss, theft, damage, or destruction of any vehicle not covered by insurance or
the attempted sale or encumbrance by Lessee of any vehicle, or the making of
any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon;
17.3 Dissolution, termination of existence, discontinuance of its business, insolvency,
business failure, or appointment of a receiver of any part of the property of, or
assignment for the benefit of creditors by, Lessee or any permitted sublessee or
the commencement of any proceedings under any insolvency, bankruptcy,
reorganization or arrangement laws by or against Lessee or any permitted
sublessee; or
17.6 Lessee or any permitted sublessee shall fail generally to pay its debts as they
become due, or shall take any corporate action in furtherance of any Event of
Default.
Anything to the contrary contained in the preceding provisions of this Section 17
notwithstanding, in the event that the Lessor shall have assigned to one or more, third
parties all or any part of its right, title and interest hereunder, each such third party shall,
to the extent of the rights assigned to it f have the right to determine whether the happening
of any of the foregoing events or conditions (a) with respect to any Interim Rentals of
Rental Payments or other payment not assigned to such third party, or (b) with respect to
any of the Lessee's obligations, covenants, liabilities, representations and warranties
regarding any vehicle, rights to which have not been assigned to such third party, shall
constitute Events of Default for purposes of such third party's rights in and to trus
Agreement*
In the event of an affirmative election in writing by any such third party to treat an
event or condition described in the preceding clause (a) or clause (b) as an Event of Default,
for purposes of such third party* rights hereunder, such third party shall, to the extent of
the rights assigned to it, be entitled to exercise the remedies provided for in Section 14*
Absent such an affirmative election by such third party, (i) the rights assigned to such third
party shall be deemed, for purposes of this Section 17, to arise under a separate lease
agreement and (ii) there shall not be any cross-default between such deemed separate lease
agreement and this Agreement.

it* Bpyfrart **» *««no
nee of any Event ol Default and at any time thereafter:
Hneiy without any further notice exercise one or more of tht foUowini
as Lessor in its tote discretion snail elects (a) declare all unpaid rental
this Agreement (discounted* however, to their then present value at
rate ol 4% per annum) to be immediately due and payable} (b) terminat
this Agreement as to any or all vehicles) (c) take possession ol the vehicls
wherever found, and for this purpose enter upon any premises ol Lessee or an
other person and remove the vehicles, without liability for suit, action or oth<
proceeding by the Lessee or any person acting by, for or under Lessee, ar
remove the same* (d) cause Lessee at its expense promptly to return the vehicl*
to Lessor in the condition set forth in Section 6.2: (e) use, hold, sell, repair, lea
-10-

or otherwise disposo of tho vohidos on tho promisos of Lessee or any othor
location without affocting tho obligations of Lessee as provided in this
Agreement (f) soU or loaso tho vohidos at public auction or by privato sate or
loaso at such timo or timos and upon such torms as Lossor may determine, frto
and cloar of any rights of Lassoo andt if notico thoroof is required by law, any
notico in writing of any such sate or teaso by Lossor to Ussoo not lass than tan
(10) days prior to tho data thoroof shall constituto roasonabte notico thortof to
Lossoot (g) procood by appropriato action oithor at law or in equity to enforce
porformanco by Lassoo of tho applicabte covonants of this Agrtomont or to
racovor damagos for tho broach thoroof} and (h) oxorciso any and ail rights
accruing to a lossor undor any applicabte law upon a dofault by a lassoo.
18.2 In addition, Lossor shall bo omitted to rocovor immodiataly as liquidated
damagost and not as a penalty, a sum oqual to tho aggregate of the following: (a)
all unpaid rentals or othor sums which are duo and payable hereunder up to the
date of redelivery to, or repossession by, Lessor; (b) any expenses paid or
incurred by Lessor in connection with exercising any of its remedies under
Soction IS*It including attorneys1 fees, legal expanses and court costs; (c) all
unpaid rentals due and to become due undor this Agreement for any vehicle
which Lessee fails to return to Lessor as provided above or converts or destroys,
or which Lessor is unable to repossess; (dj tho Tax Indemnity Amount (if Section
16 applies)! and (o) an amount equal to tho difference between U) all unpaid
rentals for any vehicle returned to or repossessed by Lessor from Mm data
thereof to tho end of tho term therefor piua tho expected Termination VUua (if
any) of such vehicle at the end of tho term therefor, and (10 tho whotesafil vaiud
of each such vehicle on such date, provided, however, that the value of each
vehicle shall not exceed tho proceeds of any sate thereof by Lessor. Should
Lessor, however, estimate its actual damages to exceed the foregoing, Lessor
may, at its option, recover its actual damages ift-lieu thereof or in addition
thereto* Lessor shall not bo obligated to sell, loaso br otherwise dispose of any
vehicle hereunder if it would impair the sale, loaso or other disposition of other
vehicles in tho ordinary course of Lessor's business or vehicles which were
previously repossessed by Lessor from any party.
15.3 None of tho remedies undor this Agreement are intended to bo exclusive, but
each shall bo cumulative and In addition to any othor remedy referred to herein
or otherwise available to Lossor at law or in equity and tho third party election
set forth in tho penultimate paragraph of Section 17 shall bo exercisable so long
as tho Events and Default described in clause (a) or (b) of said paragraph are
continuing. Any repossession or subsequent sate or loaso by Lessor of any vehicle
shall not bar an action for a deficiency as herein provided, and tho bringing of an
action or tho entry of judgment against tho Lassoo shall not bar the Lessor's
right to repossess any or all vehicles* LESSEE WAIVES ANY AND ALL RIGHTS
TO NOTICE AND TO A JUDICIAL HEARING WITH RESPECT TO THE
REPOSSESSION OP THE VEHICLES BY LESSOR IN THE EVENT OF A DEFAULT
HEREUNDER BY LESSEE.
19.

TERMINATION.
At tho end of tho Base Lease Term of any vehicle or upon tho termination of the loaso
pursuant to Soction i t hereof by Lessor, or upon tho oxorciso by Lessee of its right to retire
any vehicle from service pursuant to Soction 3.3, Lessee will return such vehicle to Lessor
at the location specified in Soction 3.3. Lessor will soil it at wholesale in a commercially
reasonable manner. If tho not soiling price is moro than tho amount (tho "Termination
Value" with respect to such vehicle) determined by applying tho formula sot forth in Exhibit
-11-

"T HI a formula tor such determination spptars thtrtin or by multiplying tht (actor sot
forth in EdUMtT by pm Agreed Price, (ii a tablt of factors for such determination appears
therein), M ^ v U I pay Lessee the surplus less any amounts owed under this Agreement. If
it is teegj^H will pay. the deficiency plus any amounts owed under this Agreement* The
net sefifflVWfet is the sale price less the sum o! (a) Lessor's direct expenses of selling,
preparing and storing such vehicle and (b) the Settlement Pee shown on Schedule "A".
20.

FURTHER ASSURANCES
Lessee shall execute and deliver to Lessor, upon Lessor's request, such instruments,
opinions of counsel, authorizing resolutions, financing statements and assurances as Lessor
deems necessary for the confirmation or perfection of this Agreement and Lessor's rights
hereunder. In furtherance thereof, Lessor may file or record this Agreement or financing
statements with respect thereto so as to give notice to any interested parties* Any such
filing or recording shall not be deemed evidence that this Agreement is intended as security
or of any intent to create a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code* Lessee
authorizes Lessor and Lessor's assignee and each subsequent assignee to file a financing
statement signed only by Lessor or such assignee in all places where such authorization is
permitted by law.
21.

SEVERABILITY.
Any provision of this Agreement that is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction
shallt as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition and
unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provision hereof. To the extent
permitted by applicable law, Lessee hereby waives any provision of law which prohibiu or
renders unenforceable any provisions hereof in any respect.
22.

NOTICES.
All notices, reports and other documents provided for herein shall be deemed to have
been given or made when mailed, postage prepaid, or delivered to a telegraph or cable
company, addressed to Lessor or Lessee at their respective addresses set forth above or such
other addresses as either of the parties hereto may designate in writing to the other from
time to time for such purpose.
23.

AMENDMENTS AND WAIVERS.
This Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules executed by
Lessor and Lessee constitute the entire agreement between Lessor and Lessee with respect
to the vehicles and the subject matter of this Agreement. No term or provision of this
Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules may be changed, waived
amended or terminated except by a written agreement signed by both Lessor and Lessee
except that Leseor may insert the serial number of any vehicle or other identify inj
information on the appropriate documents after delivery of such vehicle. No express o
implied waiver by Leseor of any Event of Default hereunder shall in any way be, or b
construed to b% a waiver of any future or subsequent Event of Default, whether similar i
kind or otherwise/
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2%. Qtftfl<yi-AV) CONSTRUCTION.
T S n O t t E M e M T SHALL BE BINOING, WHEN ACCEPTEO bY LESSOR IN THE
COMMONWEALTH Olf PENNSYLVANIA, AND SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OP THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA. LESSEE CONSENTS TO THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER LESSEE BY ANY COURT OF RECORD SITTING IN PENNSYLVANIA IN
CONNECTION WITH ANY ACTION ARISING OUT Of THIS AGREEMENT, AND WAIVES
ALL OBJECTIONS TO VENUE IN ANY SUCH COURT ANO TO SERVICE OF PROCESS ON
LESSEE AT ITS DESIGNATED AOORESS FOR PURPOSES OF NOTICE HEREUNDER IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PENNSYLVANIA
UNIFORM INTERSTATE ANO
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT OR ANY SUCCESSOR STATUTE IN CONNECTION
WITH SUCH ACTION. Lessee w u v o , insofar as permitted by law, trial by jury and right of
counterclaim in any action bttw««n the parties. The titles o! the sections of this
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or
provisions hereof. Time is of the essence of this Agreement in each and all of its provisions.
25.

PARTIES.
The provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon* and inure to the benefit of, the
permitted assigns, representatives and successors of the Lessor and Lessee. If there is more
than one Lessee named in this Agreement, the liability of each shall be joint and several.
26.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
Lessee will furnish Lessor (a) within W days of the close) oi each fiscal quarter of
Lessee a balance sheet and profit and loss statement of Lessee as of the end of such quarter,
(b) within 90 days after the close of each fiscal year of Lessee, a balance sheet and profit
and loss statement of lessee as of the end of such year, the yearly statement to be certified
by public accountants of recognized standing acceptable to Lessor, (c) such other financial
sutements and information to be furnished promptly after the same is made available to
said stockholders, and (d) such other information respecting the financial condition and
operations of Lessee as Lessor may from time to time reasonably respect.
27.

CONFESSION OP JUDGMENT.
UPON DEFAULT LESSEE HEREBY EMPOWERS THE PROTHONOTARY OR ANY
ATTORNEY OP ANY COURT OF RECORD WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR ELSEWHERE
TO APPEAR FOR IT AND, WITH OR WITHOUT ONE OR MORE DECLARATIONS FILED,
CONFESS A JUDGMENT Oil JUDGMENTS AGAINST IT IN THE FAVOR OF LESSOR OR
ANY ASSIGNEE AS OP ANY TERM FOR THE UNPAID BALANCE HEREOF WITH COSTS
OF SUIT AND AN ATTORNEY'S COMMISSION OF 10% FOR COLLECTION, WITH
RELEASE OF ALL ERRORS ANO WITHOUT STAY OF EXECUTION, AND INQUISITION
AND EXTENSION UPON ANY LEVY ON REAL ESTATE IS HEREBY WAIVED AND
CONDEMNATION AGREED TO, AND THE EXEMPTION OP ALL PROPERTY FROM LEVY
ANO SALE ON ANY EXECUTION THEREON, ANO EXEMPTION OF WAGES FROM
ATTACHMENT, ARE ALSO HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVED, ANO NO BENEFIT
EXEMPTION SHALL BE CLAIMED UNDER OR BY VIRTUE OP ANY EXEMPTION LAW
NOW IN FORCE OR WHICH MAY HEREAFTER BE ENACTED.
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121 Freeport Road,

Accept* by L M N T tMt
Pittsburgh, PA 1523*.

TERMINAL RENTAL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
LR.C 14*0X13) Statement
The undersigned hereby certifies, under penalty of perjury, that it intends that more
than 30 percent ot the use ol the vehicles subject to the above Agreement will be in the
undersigned** trade or business*
The undersigned has further been advised that it will not be treated as the owner of
the vehicles subject to the Agreement for federal income tax purposes and the undersigned
is not aware of any information which may lead Lessor to believe that this certification is
false*
iJ****
LESSEE*l*rmipftyfoAi. CAR RZNTA

Dates.

.!*>-

TO

SCHDOLI "A"
PRimixD vraicu LIASI AcnMrr
NOI-TAI OKIIITIO

ACQUISITIOR FBI
$73.00
SSTTUMBIIT Fit
$75.00 por vehicle on vehicles told by LHV on behalf of MCO, Inc.
DBA/Aserlean International Car Rental.
AFPOKIOnSIT OF EXCESS OF SALES OR SETTLEMENT PRICE IH EXCESS OF BOOK
VALUE AFTER DEDUCTION OF SETTLEMENT Fit.
Laaaor shall pay to Lessee aa a ramtal edjustseat 1001 of any such
excess. If tha asount resaining taamlta is a deficiency, Laaaaa shall
pay to Laaaor aa rental adjustsent tha asount of soak deficiency*
providad that Lassor shall guarantee to Laaaaa sinlsns nat rasala
procaada equal to 20X of tha Agreed Prica at tha beginning of tha initial
laaaa tars. If Laaaaa is otherwise persltted to and doaa alact to extend
tha laasa of any vehicle beyond tha Baaa Laaaa Tarn, Lassor shall
guarantaa 231 of tha fair value of tha vehicle at tha lacaptlon of tha
txtansion period.
"Fair valua19 shall ba daflnad as 831 of raaala value for
autosobilee, and 70% of rasala valua on light trucks aa raportad by
"Automotive Markat Raport,v published by Autosotive Auction Publishing,
Inc., aa of tha publication data immediately pracading tha laat day of
tha south which lssadlataly pracadas tha sonth in which tarsinatlon aa to
tha particular vahlcla occurs.
Sattlasanta of exceee or deficiency fro* raaala, aa daacrlbad
above, shall ba based on calendar-yeer-to-date sales.
Tentative
sattlasanta will ba sada sonthly, but adjuated quarterly, to year-to-date
reaults. For this purpoe*, a quarter la daflnad aa a threa-sonth period
ending March 31, June 30, Septesber 30 and Decesber 31.
FIIAICXW C1ARC1
Financing charge a shall ba charged at an lntaraet rata of two
flMHPfMRF
la excess of tha prise rata. Tha prise rata shall ba that
rats chafrftd by Citibank, Haw Tork. This rata will ba changed every sonth
by reference to tha prise rata aa raportad by Citibank, New Tork on tha
13th calendar day of tha applicable laaaa period*
ADMIHSTRATIV1

FB

•0011 of tha Agreed Frice par sonth par vahlcla. After fortyeight
souths, tha adslnlstrative fas shall ba 201 of tha Monthly Rental Faysant
par sonth par vahlcla.
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6.AGREED P1ZCI
$100.00 over Daalar Invoice. This pricing appllas only Co ordarad
vahiclas customarily usad by corporata flaats which ara aanufactured by
Bulck, Chevrolet, Chryslar, Dodge, Ford, Mareury, Oldsmoblle, Plymouth,
Pontlae and Chavrolat, Dodga and Ford Trucks having a G W of 11,000
pounds or under. This pricing is premised on continuation of tha vahicla
manufacturers' existing pricing structura and daalar lncantlva programs
for tha sala of motor vahiclaa to lta daalara for 1987 models. In tha
event tha pricing structura or daalar lncantlva la changad by any of tha
manufacturers for 1987 or subsequent aodals, then tha pricing agreed to
herein shall ba null and void vlth respect to that manufacturer's vehicle
and the partlaa hereto agree to negotiate revised pricing.
If a motor vehicle is taken from tha existing inventory of a dealer
or is ordered by LXV from a dealer spec if lad by Lessee, LMV shall ba
entitled to a fee of 21 over procurement coat.
7.

METHOD OP COMPUTATION FOE RECTAL PATMEETS
Each Monthly Rental Payment shall ba equal tot
I.

Tha Agraad Price leaa tha balloon Payment of aaeh vahicla divided
by tha Base Laaaa Term aa aat forth in tha Accounting Form.

PLUS
II.

8.

Tha financing amount determined by multiplying tha financing charge
by tha preceding month's book valua.

IXSUSARCE
In accordance vlth tha provisions of paragraph
Agreement, Laaaaa la to provide lnauranca aa follows*

11

of

this

Compraheualve, fire, thaft and collision insurance for tha actual
caat valua of tha equipment.
Laaaaa aha 11 ba responsible for any
dadactibia provision applicable to thia insurance.
LmBB^m shall also
pwrtda public liability insurance vlth minimum limits of $230,000 par
paraom and $300,000 par accident for bodily Injury and $230,000 for
property or a combined tingle limit in tha smount of $300,000.
LOT
Laaalng, Inc. shall ba named aa additional lnaurad and Loat Payee*
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LUSI TEIM8 II MOUTHS
Forty-tight (4*) moatha. Tht minimum ltaaa tars of any piaca of
aqtffcpamt laaat haraundar it twaiva (12) moutha. Unless Ltator otherwise
comaants, tht laaaa with rat pact to any piaca of equipment may not ba
terminated by Lattta prior to tha and of tha tvalfth (12th) month of tha
Baaa Lmm^m Tarm thereof. In tha event that Lattor to contantt and tha
laata it to terminated by Lattta, Ltttaa agraaa that Lattor shall ba
entitled, in addition to tha amount tpaclflad in Exhibit "I" hereto, to
raatonabla administratis chargat attociatad with tuch termination
Including any retldual value of tha vehicle and any penalties and charget
Imposed by financial institution.
IZTBMDD RMTAL
Hot Available
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
Should any equipmant laaaad haraundar ba terminated or replaced
prior to tha end of tha Baaa Laaaa Tarm for tha purpoaaa (directly or
indirectly) of refinancing, Lattta agraaa to pay to Lattor all cottt and
penaltitt attociatad with tuch premature termination or replacement,
including, without limitation, any and all panaltiaa of financial
inatitutlona, raatonabla administrative chargaa of Laaaor to effect tuch
prematura termination or replacemant and any loaa of anticipated tax
banaflta to Laator aa opacified in thia Agreemant.
Upon occurrence of a dafault by Laataa, or guarantor(t), if any, at
provided for undar thia Agreemant or undar tha terma of any other
agreemant of 1%MB% antarad into betwaen Lettaa and Laaaor that hat been
guarantaad by guarantor(t), if any, Laator at ita option thall hava and
may axarclaa, with raepact to thia Agreemant or any othar agreemant or
laaaa, any and all rightt and remedies available to Lattor undar tha
terma of thia Agreamant or any othar agreemant
or undar tha terma of
thia Agreamant or amy othar agreamant or laata, at lam or in equity.
Bxcapt aa otharwisa provided in paragraph 17
of thia Agreemant, a
dafault undar tha terma of amy laaaa or agreement la, at Laator1t option,
a dafault undar all laaaaa or ag^aamanta betwaan Lattor and Laaaaa and/or
guarantor, if amy.
BEOOl
Laaaaa repreeantt and warrants that it haa not ratalnad a findar or
a brokar lm connaction with thia Laaaa or tha trantactiont contemplated
by thla~*ta*ea. Laaaor rapraaaata and warranta that it haa not ratalnad a
fimdar or a brokar lm connection with thia Lm^Bm or tha tranaactiona
contamplatad haraby othar than Ranta1 Car Laaalng and Services Inc.,
whoaa faa will ba paid by Laaaor alona. Laaaaa acknowltdgtt that nalthar
Ramtal
Car
Laaalng
and
Servicee
Inc., nor
ita
employeet
or
repraeantatlvae ara tha employaa, agant or rapretentativa of Lattor for
amy purpoaaa whattoaver and haa not amd cannot make amy rapratantatlon,
s testaments, promitet, claima or contract modlficatloma of any kind or tha
lika on behalf of Laaaor.
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coffTiranoi or ADDITIONAL

PROFISIOWS

13.

Add a new section M2.4i
Leeeee represents and v i m a t i (a) that
thla Leeee constitutes, and eech Schedule and attachment when executed
will eonatltuta, A duly Authorised and valid obligation of Lattta,
anforceeble Against Laaaaa in accordanca with tha tcrme thereof, (b) that
neither tha execution by Laaaaa of thla Laaaa and aach Schadula nor ita
performance tharaof will raault in any brtach of, or eonatltuta a dafault
undar or a violation of Laaaaa'a cartiflcata of incorporation, Laaaaaft
by-lawa or any othar governing instrument of Laaaaa, any lav, rule, or
regulation or any agreement, order or Judgement, (c) that Leaaee it in
good atandlng in ita atate of incorporation art* other form of organization
and la entitled to own propertiea and to carry on buaineaa in each atate
where any vehicle la to be located, (d) that no conaent, 1 ling or othar
action by or with Any governmentel Agency or other regulatory body it
neceaaary for the acquisition and operation of tha vahlclea aa
contemplated by thla Leaae, (e) that there la no litigation pending or
threatened agalnat ita obllgatlone hereunder and (f) that all financial
•tatementa furniahed by Leaaee to Leaaor fairly preaent the financial
condition and reaulta of operatlona of Leaaee aa of the reapectlve dates
and for the reapectlve perioda covered and do not contain any untrue
statement, or any omission, of a material fact, and that aince the date
of the moat recent of auch financial statementa, there haa occurred no
material adverse change in the bualnaee or condition of Lessee. Leaaee'a
execution of each Schadula ahall eonatltuta a reaffirmation of thaaa
repreaentatlona and warrantlea. Leaaee ahall provide Leaaor an opinion
of couueel, acceptable to Leaaor and ita counael, that itema 2.4(a)
through (a) are correct aa represented.

14.

On page 7, paragraph 12. GENERAL INDEMNITT inaert on line 3 after
"in part19 tha following! "arising out of activltlee permitted hereunder
and/or (b) related".

15.

Modificationa for paragraph 10.2 and 13.1. "The above paragrapha
notwithatending, Leeeee may rent vehiclee provided undar thla Leaae for
perioda of time, not to exceed the term of tha vehicle under thla Leaae,
to licenaed drivara over 21 yeara of age and otherwiae qualifying
hereunder.
Thla right to rent la expreaaly limited to rentala in the
normal courae of Leaaee'a bualnaee undar reetrlctlona contained in the
Exhibit "Aw - MCO, Inc. Standard Form Agreement.

16.

Ad4 to paragraph 17.6 at tha end, after "defaulta" the following
aa part of tha leat sentence, "Leaaee ahall fa -1 to rent any vehicle in
eccordamce with tha tarma of Exhibit "A* or any raetrlctlone of thla

17.

DEPOSIT. Leaaor haa tha right to demand Leaaee make and maintain a
depoelt with Leaaor equal to tha laat preceding monthly rental at any
given point in time. Failure by Laeaaa to maintain auch a depoelt amount
with Leaaor, upon Leaaor1s demand, shall be a breech of thle Agreement by
Leeeee and shall eonatltuta a full Ivent of Default with all the
couaequencce thereof.

THIS S C H D U U "A" 13 A* ADDENDUM TO THE ABOVE REFERENCED PREFERRED VEHICLE
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH CAPITAL 12XD TERMS USED III THIS ADDENDUM AMD NOT OTHBRVISI
DlflHD D u l l HAVING THE RESPECTIVE MEANINGS AS SPECIFIED IN TBI AGREEMENT.
THIS SCHEDULE IS INCORPORATED INTO AND CONSTITUTES AN INTEGRAL PART OF TH]
ABOVI REFERENCED AGREEMENT.

Thii Schedule "A" le pert of the Preferred Vehicle Lease
Agreement dated December 29, 1986 between the parties and it
hereby aade a part thereof.
LMV LEASING, INC., LESSOR

*

* * * * * * * * *
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JIAL CA1 IIHTAL, LIS 8KB

0HCOHDITIOMI AMD IlIIfOCABLS
CDAtAWTT OP fATHUT
EXHIBIT G
It ceotldtratleo of tho too of Too Dollars ($10*00) aod
othor §0*4 ••< voloohla eooelderetlooe9 tho rocolpt ood
aeffleteeey of which lo hereby acknowledged, and for tho
porpooo of ooohtog to loduce LN? Loaalog» Xae« CLeeeor*) to
ootor toto o looolog arreegeaeot with
MCO, INC, DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL

("Leaaee*), tho Uoderelgeed, jolotly aod eeverailj if oort than
ooo9 doeo hereby Irrevocably ood eocoodltloeelly guarantee to
Loaaor9 ood to ita traoaforota9 aucctaaore, aod eeelgoe tho
proapt peyecot ood perforoence of all anot ood othor
ohllgotlooo vbleh aro duo or horooftor oey bocooo due aod tho
porformaaea ood obeerveoce by Leoeee of oil of tho taroat
coodltloue (loeludlog thoao portalolog to laaoraoca liability),
atlpolatlooo ood ogreeaeote poraoaot to that cartalo laaao
egreeaeot betweeo Loaaor and Loaaoo dated
Decaaber 29 . lfg 7
("Leeee~)9 loeludlog toy aod oil rcotwale, eodlflcatlooa,
aaeedaeote or ostooolooa9 lo whole or lo part, oado with
roopoct thereto*
•o act, eourao of deeliog, dalay, or oolaaloo oo tho part
of Loaaor lo oaorelalog or ooforclog ooy of Ito righto or
rooadlaa oodor tho Laaao or oodor thlo loetroaeet cieeotcd lo
cooooetloo with tho Leeee (including tho roloooo of ooy
goereotor of tho Loaao) aholl lopair or ho prajodlclal to tho
righto aod reaedlee of Loaaor horooodor aod tho ooforeoooot
hereof* Loaaor say eiteod, oodlfy, or pootpooo tho tioo aod
aeooer of peyaeot aod perforaeoce of tho terae, coodltlooa,
atlpolatlooo aod egreeseote of tho Loaaa ood ooy othor docoooot
or lootroaoot lo cooooetloo thorawlth, all without ootleo to or
eooooot by tho Uoderelgeed* Loaaor ooy ooforeo tho provleloee
horoof froa tlao to tlao oo oftoo oo tho oeeooloo therefore ooy
rorloe ood Loaaor oholl oot bo required to flrot initiate,
purooo or exerclee ooy of Ito righto or reaedloo ogoloot ooy
othor pereoo or porty primarily or ooeoodorlly liable oodor tho
Loooo*
Tho Ooderaigned ogreeo that thia laetruaeot aholl bo
governed by tho lawo of tho State of Peooeylveole and the
Underelgoed hereby eoooooto to tho jurladlctloo of tho courta
of tho Itato of Feeeoylvanla aod to bolog owed therein.
XI VITlIgg UIIIIOP, the Ooderaigned bee eaoeoted ood
dellvote* Ihlo lootroaoot uoder eeol thlo <Z£ doy of

1M7 *

Signed, e e e U d \ o d delivered
la tho prodbofo/oft

UHCOHDITtOIUl AR9 I U I ? O C A I U

COAIAUTT Of FAYMIHT

EXHIBIT H

U aoaol4orattoa of tho 100 of Too Dollart ($ 10.00) ao4
othor gao4 aa4 waluablo coii8l4aratloaa9 tho racatpt aa4
auffiaiaaoy of which lo haraby ackaowlt4go49 ao4 for tho
purpooo of aooklag to la4uca LMf Laaalng, lot. CLaaaor*) to
ootor into 0 looolog arraogaaaat with
MCO, INC. DBA /AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL
#
( liMtt # ), tho 0a4aralgaa49 jototly aa4 aovorally If ooro ehoo
*oo9 dots horaby lrravocably aa4 aaaoa41ttoaally guaraataa to
Laaaor9 aa4 to lto traaafaraaa9 aaccaaaora9 aa4 ootlfoo tho
proapt payaaot aa4 porforaaaca of ail auao aa4 othor
obllgatloaa which ara 4ua or horooftor oar bacoao 4uo aa4 tho
porforaaaca aa4 obaarraaca by Laaaao of oil of tho taraa9
coa41tlooa (laclu41ag thoao partalalag to laaoraaca liability),
atlpulatlooo an4 agraaaaata poraaaat to that cartala laaao
agraaaaot bctvoco Loaaor ao4 Laaaao 4ata4 Dacaabar 29 . lit 6
("Laaao")9 lacla41ag aay aa4 all raaawala, ao41fIcatioaa,
aaaadaaata or oatoaaloaa9 la wholo or la part, aa4o with
raapoac thorato.
10 aet9 courao of 4aallag, 4alay9 or oolaaloa oa tho port
of Loooor la oiorelalag or oaforolag aay of lto righto or
roao41oo aa4or tho Loaao or oo4or thlo laatraaoac oaoeato4 la
eoaaoetloa with tha Loaao (tacl*41ag tha roloaao of oaf
goaraator of tho Loaao) ahall lapalr or ha praju41clal to tha
rlghta aa4 raao41oa of Loaaor horoaa4ar aa4 tha aaforcoaoat
horoof. Loaaor aay aitaa49 ao41fy9 or poatpoao tho tlaa aa4
aaaaar of payaoat aa4 parforaoaca of tho torao9 eoa41tloao9
atlpalatloao aa4 agraaaaata of tha Laaaa ao4 aay othor 4ocuaoat
or laatruaaat lo coaooctloa therewith, all without aotlco to or
eoaaoat by tho 0a4eralgae4» Laaaar aay aaforeo tho prowlaloaa
haraof froa tlaa to tlaa 00 oftoa ao tho oceaaloa tharaforo aay
rarlaa aa4 Laaaor ohall aoc bo ra*alra4 to flrat loitlata,
pureua or osoreloa aay af lta rlghta or roao41oo agalaat aay
othor porooa or party prlaarlly or ooooo4arlly llablo *a4er tha
Laaaa*
Tho 0a4arolgao4 agraoo that thla laecruaeat ahall ba
goworao4 by tha lava of tho Stato of Foaaaylwaala ao4 tha
Ua4eralgae4 haroby oaaoooto to tha jarla41ctloa of tho courta
of tha ftata af Faaaaylwaala aa4 ta balag aaa4 therela*
11 VITIIgS VIIItOF, tha 9a4aralgae4 ba^eiecute4 aa4
4allwara4 thla laatruaaat oa4ar aaal thla /l*2? 4ar of

AajU^p. IM7 .

Slgoo49 aoolo4 ao4 4ellvcrc4
la tho proaooco of:

L/WVLEASING, INC.
A XCRQX ti/VANtm

SERVlQtS C 0 ' . ' c - \ '

Notice of Sale
To:

MCO, Inc., d/b/a/American
International Rent-A-Car
1380 North West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

(This Notice is for informational
purposes only as to MCO, Inc.,
which is currently in a Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceeding)

Mr. Roy W, Mallory
2980 Apache Way
Provo, Utah 84604
Mr. and Mrs. Val Conhn
2214Temple View Circle
Provo, Utah 84604
Mr. and Mrs. Tubber T. Okuda
1994 South 1175 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Pursuant to Section 18 of the Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease")
entered into between LMV LEASING, INC. ("Lessor") and MCO, Inc., d/b/a American
International Car Rental on December 29, 1986, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that
based the Lessee's default under the Lease, the Lessor will sell, as provided herein,
the vehicles listed on Schedule "A", attached hereto, with the proceeds from such
sale to be applied first to the costs of preparing the vehicles for sale, costs of sale,
and storage fees with any remaining proceeds to be credited toward the amount
owing Lessor by Lessee based on Lessee's default under the Lease.
Said vehicles will be sold after April 13, 1988, for the highest and best price in an
"AS IS" condition. Said vehicles are currently and will continue to be located, at the
time of said sale, at Nate Wade Subaru, 1207 South Mam Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and will bt sold in the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at
Nate W a d * Subaru.
DATED this 4th

day of

April , 1988.
LMV LEASING, INC
By
tdwara i. Mccracken
Title

Contoller

FILED

ri*!7r",.T C O U R T

EXHIBIT J
E. BARNEY GESAS #1179
BRETT F. WOOD #4943
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300

, i Jw

,,..;cr

Attorneys for Plaintiff
j

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

awmttA

LMV LEASING, INC.,
FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No, C88-2136
ROY W. MALLORY, VAL CONLIN,
BARBARA CONLIN, TUBBER T.
OKUDA, and MARY Y. OKUDA,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

The Court, having previously ruled on LMV Leasing, Inc.'s
("LMV") Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability,
and having found Defendants Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin ("Defendants Conlin"), Tubber T., Okuda and Mary Y. Okuda ("Defendants
Okuda") to be personally liable to LMV based on their personal
guarantys, and having determined that the only remaining issue in
this case is the amount of damages incurred by LMV, and having
requested and received Affidavits from LMV, Defendants Conlin and
Defendants Okuda as to the damages incurred by LMV, and in
conjunction with the previous ruling that LMV is entitled to
judgment against Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda, the Court

nnnr\\/\_

hereby makes the following findings of facts, pursuant to Rule 52,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as grounds for its decision:
1.

On December 29, 1986, MCO entered

into a Preferred

Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease") with LMV, pursuant to which LMV
leased to MCO fourteen (14) motor vehicles ("Motor Vehicles") for
forty-eight (48) month terms commencing on various dates.
2.

On January 26, 1987, Defendants Conlin, in their personal

capacities, executed an Unconditional Irrevocable and Personal
Guaranty ("Conlin Guaranty"), wherein they agreed to be jointly,
severally, and personally liable for all amounts owed to LMV by
MCO under the Lease, including any damages LMV may suffer due to
any breach of the Lease by MCO.
3.

On

February

11, 1987, Defendants

Okuda,

in their

individual capacities, executed an Unconditional Irrevocable and
Personal Guaranty ("Okuda Guaranty"), wherein they agreed to be
jointly, severally, and personally liable for all amounts owed to
LMV by MCO under the Lease, including any damages LMV may suffer
due to> any breach of the Lease by MCO.
4.

Pursuant to section 4 of the Lease, MCO agreed to make

monthly lease payments to LMV as rent for each Motor Vehicle. All
lease payments were due on the 15th day of each month and would
be assessed a late charge equal to the amount of two percent (2%)
per month of the rental payment amount past due.
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5.

The amount of the monthly lease payments due from MCO to

LMV under the Lease is calculated on the basis of an "Agreed
Price" as defined in Schedule A of the Lease, plus a financing
charge, a minimal administrative fee, and a late charge, if
applicable,
6.

In compliance with the Lease, LMV delivered to MCO

fourteen (14) Motor Vehicles selected by LMV,
7.

Although invoices were submitted to MCO by LMV on a

monthly basis, MCO failed to make lease payments under the Lease
due in April, May, June, and August, 1987, in a timely manner and
late charges were assessed to MCO for those months' late payments.
8.

MCO has failed to make the monthly lease payments under

the Lease since July 15, 1987, and is therefore in default under
the Lease.
9.

MCO made only a partial payment of $2,587.36 toward the

total monthly lease payment due on April 15, 1987, of $3,384.80,
leaving a balance of $797.44 owing by MCO on April's lease
payment.

MCO was also assessed an additional late fee in July,

1987, for failure to pay LMV the remaining amount due on the April
15, 1987, lease payment.
10.

On August 13, 1987, MCO filed a petition for relief with

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
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11.

Section 7 of the Lease requires that MCO pay for the

titling, registration,

licenses and

inspection of the Motor

Vehicles.
12.

In the event of default, the Lease provides that LMV may

declare all unpaid future lease payments immediately due and
payable. This accelerated amount is calculated by determining the
future lease payments due on all vehicles leased to MCO and then
discounting that amount to its present value at a discount rate
of six percent (6%).
13.

The Lease further provides that LMV may recover as

"liquidated damages" an amount equal to the sum of all unpaid
lease payments to date, the total late charges to date, all
administrative expenses, all attorney's fees and court costs, plus
the accelerated

amount

of all

future unpaid

lease payments

discounted to their present value, less the proceeds from the sale
of the Motor Vehicles.
14.

Section 18 of the Lease also provides that LMV may

recover all expenses it has incurred or will incur, including all
attorney's fees, legal expenses and court costs, in exercising
its remedies and protecting its rights under the terms of the
Lease.
15.

Section 18.1(f) of the Lease provides that upon default

by MCO, LMV may "sell or lease the vehicles at a public auction
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16•

Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda were given and

received notice that MCO was in default under the terms of the
Lease with LMV and that as personal guarantors they were personally liable for MCCVs performance under the Lease.
17.

Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda did not respond

to this Notice of Default. .
18.

After MCO defaulted under the Lease and LMV obtained the

Motor Vehicles from MCO, a Notice of Sale ("Notice") was sent to
each of the defendants and MCO. This Notice stated that LMV would
sell the Motor Vehicles, pursuant to the terms of the Lease, after
April 13, 1988, what the terms of the sale would be, and that the
Motor Vehicles were located at a certain used car lot.

This

Notice also stated that the Motor Vehicles would be sold in the
same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located on that
used car lot.
19.

The Motor Vehicles were sold within a one (1) month time

period beginning on or about May 10, 1988, and ending on or about
June 10, 1988. The net proceeds from the sale totalled $80,100.00
which is approximately 99% of the Motor Vehicles' wholesale
values.
20.

Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda have made

payments to LMV at any time.
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21.

The total amount due to LMV from MCO for all late

charges, unpaid lease payments, administrative fees, and accelerated amounts, less the proceeds from the sale of the vehicles, is
$44,145.79. However, the Court determined that damages should not
be based on the formula provided in the Lease but rather on the
unamortized balance of the lease payments owed, plus all unpaid
and accrued monthly lease payments, late charges, and administrative fees, less the net sale proceeds from the Motor Vehicles.
22.

On March 20, 1989, the Court granted LMVfs Motion for

Summary Judgment establishing Defendants Conlin and Defendants
Okudas'

unconditional

and

irrevocable,

joint,

several, and

personal liability under their respective guarantys.
23.

Pursuant to the Lease, MCO could have terminated the

Lease* with LMV at any time by providing written notice to LMV of
such termination and surrendering the Motor Vehicles.
24.

Under the Lease, MCO had to return any and all of the

Motor Vehicles then remaining in its possession at the end of the
Lease and MCO did not have the option to extend the life of the
Lease.
25.

Pursuant to the Lease, no refundable deposit was required

by LMV from MCO at the inception of the Lease.
26.

The term of the Lease is less than the economic life of

the Motor Vehicles.
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Based upon the above findings, the Court concludes as a matter
of law as follows:
The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Conlin and
Defendants Okuda and has subject matter jurisdiction over this
case.

This case involves a lease and not a sale subject to a

security interest. The Conlin Guaranty and the Okuda Guaranty are
unconditional guarantys of payment which, upon the default of MCO,
fixed the liability of Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda at
the amount owed by MCO.

LMV was free to proceed against the

guarantors at that point without exhausting collection efforts
against MCO.
LMV

acted

in

a commercially

reasonable

manner

when it

repossessed the Motor Vehicles and sold them on a used car lot
through a private sale.

This method of sale produced a greater

amount of sale proceeds upon the sale of the Motor Vehicles than
would have been produced by selling them at an auction to a used
car dealer at substantially lower prices.
When MCO was in default under the Lease, LMV had the right
under the Lease to accelerate the remaining lease payments and
seek to collect all those, as well as all past amounts due under
the Lease, from the guarantors.
The Motion to Strike Affidavit for Attorneys' Fees filed by
Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda is denied. Said affidavit
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substantially complies with the rules set forth in the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration.
Accordingly, judgment will be entered
Conlin

and

Defendants

Okuda,

jointly

against Defendants

and

severally,

for

$50,500.00, which includes damages in the amount of $37,000.00,
plus interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum
compounded annually until paid, together with attorney's fees of
$13,500.00. The Judgment granted herein is final pursuant to Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Clerk is expressly
directed to enter the Judgment as final.
DATED this

W

day of //V/$^y

, 1989.

BY Tfe COURT}

HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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